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Abstract
This thesis explores the civil rights movement in Danville, Virginia, and focuses
on the tactics employed by prominent white men who, because they controlled the city’s
leading institutions of power, were able to effectively squelch the movement by the end
of the 1963 summer. This paper also traces how the Danville movement followed the
path of the classical phase of the national civil rights movement, and represents the
manner in which broader trends and events played out in small southern cities. The
Danville movement began with a student-led sit-in at the whites only public library a few
months after the sit-ins in Greensboro, North Carolina. Unsure of how to handle such a
show of protest against segregated order in Danville, the all-white city council struggled
to decide how to proceed. Many of the councilmen drew upon the library’s significance
as the last Confederate capitol to defend the continued exclusion of black citizens from
the library, while others argued the white voters should decide. Eventually, the federal
government intervened, and the library was officially open to all in September of 1960.
Three years later, in May 1963, a direct protest movement began shortly after the massive
protests in Birmingham, Alabama. Civil rights demonstrators once again surprised
Danville with a show of protest, and though white leaders initially struggled to confront
the movement, they later created a coalition of white resistance to fight back against the
movement. The Danville police borrowed violent control tactics from police chief Bull
Connor in Birmingham, the city council passed laws to criminalize the movement and its
participants, and the court system made sure all were convicted of their supposed crimes.
The Danville civil rights movement was brought to an end by August of 1963 because of
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the social, judicial, and political power held by local white institutions who worked
together to obstruct civil rights achievements in the city.

iv

1

Introduction
Screams filled the air as black demonstrators ran for cover from high-pressure
water hoses directed at them by the local fire department. The police chief looked on to
survey the sudden violence that erupted as a direct result of his own orders given to the
men, his all-white police force. As the hoses washed demonstrators down the street,
police began beating those who had fallen down and released their dogs into the crowd.
Deputized garbage collectors joined in the chase and arrest of demonstrators, most of
whom were teenagers and young adults. It was a bloody and chaotic event, and many
were severely injured and sent to the hospital for medical treatment. To anyone familiar
with the American civil rights narrative of the 1950s and 1960s, this story sounds like one
that belongs to the 1963 marches in Birmingham, Alabama. However, this scene was not
one from Birmingham at all. The scene was one from Danville, Virginia, and, as one
demonstrator would recall fifty years later, “Danville was worse than Birmingham”.1
The Danville movement received a significant amount of resources by large and
well-funded national civil rights organizations. The Danville Christian Progressive
Association (DCPA) was an official affiliate office of the Southern Christian Leadership
Conference (SCLC), and brought Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., to Danville multiple times
in 1963. King was one of the most well-known leaders of the movement, and this was a
big deal to a small city like Danville. Additionally, the Student Nonviolent Coordinating
Committee (SNCC) came to the city and brought a team of activists, journalists,
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strategists, and a photographer to document and draw attention to the movement. SNCC
also taught demonstrators how to employ certain techniques to protest nonviolently while
marching, singing, and coming under arrest. Additionally, plenty of locals were donating
as much money as they could to sustain the movement financially. Yet, even with all
these incredible resources provided to them, the Danville movement was quickly
extinguished.
Thus, the puzzle left to solve in the aftermath is, “How?” How could so much
help from well-funded national organizations not result in a win for local civil rights in
Danville? Danville was a small city in 1960 with a little over 46,000 residents according
to the U.S. Census, and at the height of the movement an estimated few hundred
individuals protested at one time. This was a relatively small number in comparison to
some of the larger, more well-known civil rights movements. The movement in
Birmingham, Alabama, brought out more than 1,000 protesters to participate in the
Children’s March, and the famous march from Selma to Montgomery saw more than
25,000 participants. It is possible that an argument could be made there were some errors
on the part of the Danville movement’s leaders. Whether they hoped to secure more press
coverage or simply felt famous activists would help their cause in some other way,
Danville leaders seemed desperate to grasp onto prominent national figures like Martin
Luther King Jr., even though in the end he abandoned them. It is also arguable that the
disagreements over how to proceed with the protest negatively affect the execution,
longevity, and effectiveness of the movement. However, the evidence points to entirely
different factors that were completely out of the movement’s control.
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This thesis argues that the answer lies in the strategies employed by Danville’s
leading white authorities, which were in charge of the city’s political and judicial
institutions, in their efforts to work collectively and curtail any significant progress for
civil rights in Danville. A national shift in civil rights since the Brown v. Board decision
made clear that the power of Jim Crow was waning, and white authorities in Danville
were willing to do anything to hold on to the power they held in the city. Any
concessions to the black community would take Danville one step closer to full civil
rights, an act that would surely weaken the powerful hold white power had in Danville
law and politics. This thesis traces the tactics utilized by those in power in Danville as
they fought against the federal government and their own citizens to resist significant
civil rights achievements in Danville. Even though outside organizations brought key
resources to the Danville movement, there was one thing they could not bring with them:
political power. The fact was that white authorities in Danville held all of the political
power it would have taken to make the movement truly successful, yet were unwilling to
allow any of that power to go towards the demands being made by black citizens.
Chapter 1, “Danville, 1960 - May”, examines the response to the library sit-in by
the Danville City Council, the rhetoric the councilmen used, and the methods they
employed as they were faced with a situation they were vastly unprepared for. Chapter 2,
“Danville, 1963” looks at the reaction by the city council, Danville Police Department,
and judicial system to the direct protest action that began in May of 1963. More prepared
this time, these institutions worked together to create a wall of white resistance to the
movement by intentionally creating laws intended to criminalize the movement and its
participants, and enforced these laws with violent and discriminatory physical tactics.
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They beat the movement down, literally and metaphorically, to tire it of both people and
monetary resources by carrying out mass arrests and violently responding to protests.
Chapter 3, “Danville, 1963 – July”, takes a close look at the legal fallout of the Danville
movement as the protest phase dwindled. This chapter leans heavily on court transcripts
to provide insights into how the judicial system prevented any semblance of a fair trial
for those arrested during the protests, as the judge and city attorneys held the power to
dominate the courtroom. The legal battles, which began in July of 1963, would stretch on
for an entire decade.
The sources used for this paper were both the most exciting and most frustrating
part of the project. The Danville movement has largely escaped the attention of
historians, except for a few shorter articles through the state library in Richmond,
Encyclopedia Virginia, and online journals held articles authored by historians and
researchers that either focused on Danville or utilized it as a prominent example in their
writing. Researching for primary sources through the ongoing Coronavirus pandemic was
especially challenging. Most of the sources I used for this paper were not digitized, and it
wasn’t until July that the libraries were re-opened to researchers. Even then, the
availability of time and resources differed from place to place. Danville Public Library
has yet to open its microfilm machine up again for public use, which made me even more
grateful for the Register articles I collected years earlier during an undergraduate project.
The lack of accessibility was extremely frustrating, which led me to begin extensive
internet searches to find people that may still be alive who participated in the movement.
I spent hours online googling old phone numbers, calling places of business, sending
Facebook messages, and leaving voicemails for people I wasn’t even sure would call me
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back. This was extremely rewarding, as the people it led me to whom I was able to speak
with brought a new life to the paper that gave me a deeper appreciation for all of the
research I was doing. It was also these personal phone calls that led me to some of my
more crucial sources, such as the Juby Towler book I discuss in Chapter 2.
Throughout my thesis I rely heavily on the reporting by the Danville Register, a
newspaper that is still in print today. The Danville Public Library has copies of the
newspaper on microfilm, most of which are very difficult to read either due to quick
scanning or old equipment that failed to capture the images very well. I tried to return
many times over the summer and fall for the purposes of gathering more for this project,
but the microfilm machine remained unavailable for public use due to the pandemic.
Thankfully, the Sutherlin Mansion was able to dig up several binders from a forgotten
researcher that had many copies of the articles I needed for this project. I was unable to
find any institutional history on the Register itself, but multiple individuals relayed to me
it was clearly the “white paper”, and owned by a white family in the city. I rely mostly on
reporting from the Register, rather than other newspapers, television broadcasts, or radio
clips because it is the source that holds the most robust collection of accessible
information. Other sources of media that may have covered the Danville events,
including the Bee which I only reference once or twice in the thesis, were nearly
impossible to find or access.
The Register is important for several reasons. Primarily, it serves as a detailed
record of events throughout the 1960 desegregation of the public library and subsequent
protesting during the summer of 1963. It is an invaluable resource when examining how
white authorities responded to the sudden challenge before them of black Danville
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citizens advocating for desegregation and better employment in the city. The newspaper
also provided a public platform for city leaders to voice their moral judgements as the
civil rights movement progressed through the early 1960s. It privileged the perspectives
of the white authorities, and when Danville citizens read their paper every day, it was
these perspectives that told them what to think about the ongoing civil rights movement.
The only statements the newspaper would include for black citizens were ones of
negative commentary on the movement, as the paper continuously sought to undermine
the individuals participating in the movement.
I also extensively utilize legal documents from the ongoing court trials that took
place after the 1963 protest movement. Between multiple trips to Richmond and back
home collecting scans of these documents, I somehow ended up with over 1,000 pages in
legal paperwork to sift through. These were incredibly insightful for connecting together
the legal implications of the movement, which I incorporate throughout my thesis. The
first of the many trials that took place were for the convictions of several movement
leaders in violation of Judge Aiken’s injunction against parading, which he enacted in
early June. This injunction was based on an Antebellum slave law in Virginia, and by the
end of the trials these black leaders were found guilty and sentenced to fines and jail
time. The court records for this case also held insight into how the system of white power
operated inside the city courtroom. The judge and city prosecutors clearly held the upper
hand, while the NAACP defense lawyers were interrupted, overlooked, and ignored
throughout the entire trial. The appeals petitions I later found stashed in the basement of
the Danville Police Department’s records room showed how the city council and police
department worked together to entrap protestors as the movement continued into July.
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Judge Aiken’s injunction did not seem to deter the demonstrators much, thus the city
council changed the parading ordinance to intentionally criminalize any ongoing protests.
They enacted, executed, and punished individuals under this new law that was never even
made public or legally published. These revelations were incredible, and really helped me
tie in some of the heaviest points I attempt to make in the paper.
The personal interviews I was able to conduct really helped me understand what
the situation in Danville was like during the civil rights movement. Even though it has
been almost sixty years, the people I interviewed still held sharp, clear memories from the
traumatic events of the 1963 summer. Most were reasonably easy to track down. I used a
local phone book to find Jerry Williams Jr. and reached out to High Street Baptist Church
on Facebook, who put me in touch with Carolyn Wilson. The Zellners were the hardest to
track down. I knew Robert and Dorothy Zellner, two key SNCC activists in Danville
during the movement, had the potential to provide me with essential information for my
thesis. I never got in touch with Robert, but I was finally able to get in contact Dorothy
after leaving several messages on (unknown to me) her work, home, and cell phone.
Dorothy and I chatted for almost two hours when we were finally able to speak, and she
admitted she still thought of her time in Danville even though so many decades had
passed. In 2007 when the city placed a historical marker for Bloody Monday in front of
the courthouse, she read about it online and printed out a picture to keep for herself. She
had just as many questions for me about the city now as I did for her, and together she
helped me fill in the questions I had on SNCC’s role in the city during the hot 1963
summer. Dorothy was one of the protestors beaten during the Bloody Monday attack, and
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she told me that out of all the places she traveled with SNCC, including Mississippi,
Danville was by far the most violent she ever personally experienced.
I found myself with an incredible source base, but also one that is far from
perfect. As I surveyed what I had collected, the overwhelming majority of sources I
found myself in possession of were white-authored sources. This is, at least in part, what
led me to construct a project that provided insights into the methods and strategies used
by white authorities in Danville to combat the local civil rights movement. Most of my
sources stem from institutions, thus a significant amount of personal information on the
individuals I highlight in the thesis is lacking. The thesis could benefit greatly from an
analysis of the primary authority figures I include, such as the town council members,
John Carter, James Ferguson, Judge Archibald Aiken, Chief Eugene McCain, Juby
Towler, and city mayor Julian Stinson. Their personal stories have the potential to add an
even deeper level of understanding to their actions taken during the early 1960s in
Danville, but those records do not seem to exist. Additionally, though I tried to
incorporate as many black voices as I could, there could still be more here to speak to the
mid-20th century struggles in Danville. This thesis lays the groundwork for a much larger
project that may take place one day, as there is still much to explore.
Throughout my thesis I work with the contrasting ideals and actions of “insiders”
versus “outsiders” quite a bit. The “insiders” are those who held the power in the city of
Danville. They are the white men who ran the city, held elected offices, and enforced its
laws. Not all of the men in power fought as ferociously as some to maintain the city’s
social and political order, but all in power benefited from the systematic attack and
destruction of the Danville civil rights movement. The “outsiders” here in the thesis take

9
on two primary forms. First, the “outsiders” were those who, although they were pysicaly
located within the city of Danville, were outside of the city’s primary institutions of
power. The demonstrators themselves were considered “outsiders” by local authorities
and the broader public as they fought for ideals that did not fall in line with the agenda of
white city leadership. Secondly, “outsiders” represent any authority located outside of the
city that white leadership felt was unfairly intervening in Danville.
During the fight over the library in 1960, the NAACP and federal court system
were the outside enemies who were pushing their unwanted agendas onto Danville. The
NAACP branch in Danville, though operating under local leadership, was criminalized
by city councilmembers and the Register as a negative national influence in Danville. The
federal courts, which ruled in favor of the NAACP for desegregation in the city, were
portrayed as a governmental force infringing on the constitutional rights of Danville’s
citizens. City leadership then combined this language with explicit references to
Danville’s self-important history as the temporary Confederate capitol. These messages,
released to the public through the Register, were intended to influence the white public to
perceive these issues in the same way as the white authority figures saw them. As the
1963 movement began, the “outsiders” label went to those coming into Danville from
outside the city, primarily those from the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee
(SNCC). Even though the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) had an
affiliate office in Danville, the Danville Christian Progressive Association (DCPA),
SNCC was the only national organization that sent several members to aid in the direct
protest movement for an extended period of time in order to help the movement organize
and grow.
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I also attempted to create a strong connection between the national civil rights
movement and the Danville movement. It was important to both distinguish and
contextualize where Danville fell in the scope of the broader civil rights history and its
more well-known events. Danville was the perfect example of a city which fell into a
chain reaction of protests that stemmed from national events that captured the attention of
the nation in the early 1960s. I always suspected that the sit-ins in Greensboro, North
Carolina, inspired Danville’s youth branch of the NAACP to conduct the sit-in at the
library just a short time later, and to have that confirmed by my sources solidified
Danville’s position following Greensboro. Similarly in 1963, I argue the events of
Birmingham, Alabama, affected the Danville movement in 1963 in multiple ways. Not
only did the Birmingham march serve as the spark which finally ignited the direct protest
movement after years of taking slow, calculated measures, but I also argue police Chief
Eugene McCain also borrowed tactics from Birmingham police Chief Bull Connor. Many
of the tactics utilized by Chief McCain mirror accounts printed in the Register about the
Birmingham march, and McCain was later described as a “Bull Connor type” by Robert
Zellner, an active SNCC member familiar with both chiefs due to his time spent in
Danville and Birmingham.
This thesis draws upon current and past historiography while also serving
to fill important gaps that continue to exist. There is no historiography on the Danville
civil rights movement, thus I gathered inspiration from civil rights historians who have
written about other movements and key activists from the national level and transferred
some of these ideas to Danville. Clayborn Carson’s book In Struggle: SNCC and the
Black Awakening of the 1960s was important for helping me contextualize the importance
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of Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee in Danville. Carson characterized the
first several years of the organization as the “first phase” of SNCC, and their work in
Danville fell into this time frame. Understanding SNCC as an organization that sought
out rural areas for direct aid that other national groups shied away from was useful in
understanding their quick response and action in Danville, as well as how their work
impacted the movement as a whole. John Dittmer’s work Local People: The Struggle for
Civil Rights in Mississippi served as an example on how to write about local people in the
civil rights movement. His book called for more research on local towns and cities during
the civil rights narrative, for there cannot be a national narrative without the thousands of
local stories that exist to create that national narrative. This perspective was highly
influential as I struggled with thinking of how to contextualize Danville as an important
local movement that held national relevance. Most importantly, books such as At the
Dark End of the Street by Danielle McGuire and A More Beautiful and Terrible History
by Jeanne Theoharis led me to realize that not all civil rights histories are triumphant.
Like Danville, they are not all successful or lead to significant civil rights achievements
for the local black community. However, these stories are just as important as
triumphalist narratives as they create a more realistic representation of the American civil
rights movement.
This paper seeks to fill a significant gap that remains in civil rights historiography
by examining the specific tactics of resistance employed by white authorities in the city
in order to cut off the movement. The white authority structures I primarily draw upon in
this thesis are the Danville city council, the local judicial system, and the police
department. The city council, comprised of the mayor and councilmembers were
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responsible for the passage of local laws and decisions. The judicial system would then
enforce these racist laws in the court room, ensuring that a fair trial would be impossible.
The police department enforced these laws in the streets and resorted to violent tactics to
clear the streets of demonstrators. I frequently draw upon the commentary of the white
men who led and worked inside these institutions, as these men represent a combined
system of institutional racism in Danville that worked together to keep the white political
and social interest in power. By approaching the story from this perspective, the ways in
which these authorities figures worked together to create interlocking strategies that built
an almost impenetrable wall of white resistance becomes clear. These institutions of
white power in Danville initially struggled to figure out how to handle a protest, like the
first sit-in at the library, but later adapted as they worked together diligently to cut off a
movement seeking equal opportunities for black citizens in the city. The close
examination of resistance tactics allows for a broader picture of the civil rights story to
emerge, and in many ways explains the significant lack of progress that resulted from the
Danville movement. Exploring these institutions of white resistance and how they
responded to local movements may be the key to better understanding the successes and
failures of the national civil rights movement.
This thesis also explores the ways in which tactics were borrowed from national
and local events on both sides of the civil rights movement, an examination that is
lacking from current civil rights historiography. In the case of Danville, it is clear that
civil rights demonstrators borrowed tactics from the larger national movement such as
marching, singing freedom songs, and carrying signs that stated their demands. They also
learned strategies directly from larger organizations, like SNCC and the SCLC, that were
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aiding other small localities in their own movements. Similarly, white authorities in
Danville borrowed techniques of massive resistance they deemed successful from other
cities across the South. Though there are no records in which he explicitly states he
borrowed tactics from Birmingham, the action taken by Chief McCain during the summer
of 1963 mirror the police response in Birmingham almost exactly. This similarity was not
lost on the Danville protestors, as many recalled later in their lives that what happened in
Danville was exactly like, or even worse, than what happened in Birmingham. A closer
examination of such borrowing techniques during the civil rights has the potential to
provide historians with a deeper understanding of the way the civil rights movement
operated, and expose links and influences that existed between local movements even if
they were states apart. It is local movements like Danville that fill the national narrative,
and their connections to better-known events in civil rights history deserve to be
examined to complete the American civil rights story.
It is easy to look at a civil rights story like Danville’s and dismiss it as a failure.
Nothing is inevitable, but in considering the extensive and powerful massive resistance
that white leadership put forth in Danville, it is hard not to see the movement as doomed
from the start. Yet, even in the face of such overwhelming obstacles, the larger Danville
movement was able to achieve certain accomplishments. A desegregated library,
integration of the public schools, and the hiring of a black police officer and store clerk to
name a few. These accomplishments would serve as watershed events to successes much
further into the future, even if those successes did not arrive until decades later. The
reality of the national civil rights movement may look much more like Danville than it
does in Birmingham or Selma. Though larger events are understandably what captured
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national attention, and thus the attention of historians, these smaller movements that
burned quick and bright have the potential to tell us just as much about the larger civil
rights struggle. Until more of these histories are captured, a true image of the civil rights
movement in the 1960s remains to be seen.
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Greensboro, 1960
“I’m sorry, we don’t serve Negroes here,” the waitress told Ezell Blair Jr. as he
asked her for a cup of coffee. Blair and three of his friends from A&T University in
Greensboro, North Carolina, were sitting at a Woolworth’s lunch counter downtown, an
action they knew could be dangerous. Woolworth’s permitted black patrons to enter the
store and eat, but they were expected to stand and eat at the end of the L- shaped counter
rather than sitting on one of the barstools. The students sat firmly in their seats, refusing
to stand and eat at the end of the bar. Though tensions were high in the restaurant, there
was surprisingly little that took place after the young men claimed their seats. A
policeman showed up, but he simply walked behind the students without saying anything.
Reporters and photographers gathered outside as word of the young men’s sit-in spread,
all while the students kept their seats. Blair and his comrades left shortly after closing
time and the doors were locked behind them.2
This sit-in, conducted on February 1st, 1960, was not the first of its kind. There
had been other sit-ins performed by black students sporadically throughout the South
prior to 1960, but these had brought about little change. The change that did occur was
most effective at the local level, as there was yet to be a nation-wide cohesive
movement.3 The sit-in at Greensboro set the city apart as it ignited the national firestorm
that followed the action of the A&T students. It would have been impossible for the crew
to know whether their trip to Woolworth’s would create an effect that stretched beyond
the city limits, but it certainly did. Not only did the sit-in spark a broader, national sit-in

2
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movement throughout the southern United States, but the Student Nonviolent
Coordinating Committee (SNCC) emerged from Greensboro as an organization that
would play a crucial role in the national civil rights movement.4
The attempt to desegregate the Woolworth’s lunch counter launched widespread
grassroots integration efforts in the South at the start of the 1960s. The Greensboro sit-in
and those that followed were characterized by meticulous planning, contrary to initial
historiography which portrayed the movement as spontaneous. One of the cities directly
influenced by the Greensboro movement was Danville, Virginia, which sits less than
sixty miles north of Greensboro on the southern Virginia border.5 Articles filled
Danville’s local paper, the Register, of the fallout from Greensboro.6 Shortly after, the
student-led branch of Danville’s chapter of the National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) picked up the story and wanted to create a
version of Greensboro in their own city. Under the influence of Greensboro’s events, the
Danville group carried out the first steps of the Danville civil rights movement. It would
have been impossible for the students to know they were igniting a movement that would
drag on for years to come. The library sit-in was the first step in a long battle that would
take place in court rooms and the city’s streets. Greensboro sparked a protest movement
across countless localities in America, and that included Danville, Virginia.
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Morgan, Iwan and Philip Davies, eds., From Sit-Ins to SNCC: The Student Civil Rights Movement in the
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6, 1960.; “Negro Demonstrations At Lunch Counters Spread To Two More Cities in Carolina,” Register,
February 9, 1960.
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Danville, 1960
“The incidents were the first hints of a protest movement in this city.”
-The Register, April 3rd, 1960
One month after the sit-in movements began in Greensboro, North Carolina, a
group of Danville NAACP Youth members resolved to execute change in their city.
Planning had begun shortly after the Woolworth sit-in, and Greensboro’s proximity to
Danville had the town buzzing with news of the nearby protests.7 Chalmers Mebane, a
twenty-three year-old military man who had returned to Danville to finish his high school
degree, first collected a prospective group of students from Langston High School willing
to execute a sit-in movement.8 An active member at the Youth NAACP meetings,
Mebane and the other students began meeting at Loyal Baptist Church to make their
plans.9 Two of the members included brothers Robert and Jerry Williams whose father
was a prominent local attorney and active member in the Danville NAACP branch. After
listening to Jerry Williams Sr.’s many dinner table discussions regarding the law, the
brothers convinced the youth group it would be best to go a different route than
Greensboro and target a public facility rather than a private one. The group hoped that the
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law would side with them if they attempted to desegregate a public facility rather than a
privately owned business. They set their sights on the all-white public library.10
In 1960, segregation was the way of life in Danville, Virginia. Schools, public
transportation, restaurants, recreational facilities, and entertainment venues were all
segregated. Longtime Danville residents Jerry Williams, Carolyn Wilson, Thurmon
Echols, and Iris Dance all made similar statements during their interviews; in Danville,
everything was segregated. The city segregated its public library system into two
branches, and William F. Grasty was the name of the facility that served black city
patrons. This library was “totally inadequate” as Jerry Williams tells it, much like most of
the city’s segregated facilities. Williams recalled that Grasty library held few of the books
that many black children needed in order to complete their school assignments. The
students would have to walk to Grasty to place a book request, only to have it be brought
over from the all-white Memorial Library just a few blocks down the street.11 The
Memorial Library contained around 35,000 volumes available to its white patrons, while
Grasty only held 8,000 volumes, confirming Williams’ memory.12 The Memorial Library
was located at the former Sutherlin Mansion, which held local fame as the Last Capitol of
the Confederacy. In transforming the mansion into a library, this “showpiece” of Danville
served as a public memorial to the Lost Cause of the Confederacy.13 The mansion, a
prominent symbol of white pride rooted deep in the old days of the Civil War, would
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soon sit in the center of the debate over the library, segregation in the city, and the
expectations of citizens in Danville by those in power – namely the all-white City
Council.

Danville’s white citizens celebrated the Sutherlin Mansion-turned-Memorial
Library into a monument to its Confederate past.14 Built in 1859, the mansion was home
to the city’s tobacco tycoon William T Sutherlin, who served as a quartermaster during
the Civil War.15 As the Union was encroaching on Richmond, Virginia, Confederate
President Jefferson Davis fled to Danville with his cabinet and stayed at Sutherlin’s
home. By 1960, the building had doubled as both the white library and a monument to the
“Last Capitol of the Confederacy” for thirty years.16 The city created its first public
library system in 1930, though it is unknown exactly why the mansion was chosen to
serve as the city’s first library.17 A likely explanation is just how important the mansion
and property were to the white citizens of Danville. During the fight over desegregation
of the public library, the rhetoric from leaders like former congressman Chase Wheatley,
councilman John Carter, and city prosecutor James Ferguson made it clear there were
strong currents of community pride in the mansion and what it stood for: the lost cause of
the Civil War. The city put the mansion on a pedestal of white supremacy even though
they had lost the war, and leaders like Wheatley and Carter saw themselves as protecting
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their southern identity by excluding African Americans from the building. The refusal to
integrate the library seemingly represented the last stand of Danville’s Confederate cause.
City leaders like Wheatley accused the youth group of targeting the library
because of its Civil War history, but Jerry Williams was adamant statements like those
were not true.18 Williams explicitly said it was not the NAACP’s decision to conduct the
sit-in, and the library’s location in the former capitol of the Confederacy meant nothing to
the youth group or African Americans in Danville. The group had chosen the library
because it was a public institution, and they knew they had better chances for success at
attempting to integrate a city-operated facility rather than a private one. Williams also
said the white library was targeted because of how inadequate the library for black
residents was in comparison to the white facilities. When Williams testimony is
compared to statements like those made by Wheatley, it becomes clear the mansion
carried more significance with the white population of the city than with its black
citizens. More than just an affront to white order, it was evident white leadership in the
city was insulted by the attempted integration of the library at the Sutherlin Mansion, and
interpreted the movement to allow black patrons inside as a personal affront.
The day of the planned sit-in, April 2nd, the group of black students marched up
the front steps and through the doors of the Memorial Library, shocking city librarian
Florence Robertson. Chalmers Mebane, Robert and Jerry Williams, and approximately 13
other students approached Ms. Robertson’s desk and asked her to issue them library
cards. Stunned that the students would brave such a request, the librarian instructed the
group she would not be issuing them cards because the library was closed. Despite her
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claim, the students sat down and stayed for about twenty minutes before finally exiting
the building.19 Once they departed, city manager Edward Temple arrived to conduct “a
full investigation” of the incident.20 After leaving the library, the youths regrouped and
then headed to Ballou Park, another public facility only open to white residents. The
students started playing basketball until a sudden rainstorm forced them to seek shelter
under the pavilion. While there, a group of white teenagers in a car pulled up to the park
and began verbally harassing the black students. Shortly after the white students’ arrival,
city manager Temple and a few Danville city police officers arrived on scene and ordered
all students to leave stating the park was closing. The police interrogated the black
students regarding their presence in the park, not bothering to detain the group of white
students who were also there. In a press statement given the next day, NAACP chapter
president Doyle Thomas spoke for the group, stating their reasons for entering the library
were because they needed books for a school assignment that were not available at either
the Langston High School library or the Grasty branch. Additionally, the sit-in at the park
was due to no comparable facility being offered for African American children in the
city.21
News articles released following the integration attempts portray the students as
carrying out the will of the NAACP, yet Jerry Williams is adamant that was not the
case.22 In the weeks following the sit-in city leaders would condemn the act as sponsored
by the NAACP, illustrating the group as an outside organization seeking to impose its
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will in Danville. Williams asserted that his father, NAACP lawyer Jerry Williams Sr.,
discouraged his sons from attempting to integrate because of possible dangers and legal
costs if any of the teens were jailed. In spite of Williams Sr.’s pleas, the group remained
steadfast in their decision to sit-in at the library. Though the NAACP was hesitant, they
pledged their support to the students no matter the outcome.23 The desegregation attempts
caused a frantic city council to close all public libraries in Danville until further notice,
igniting a nasty legal battle that would engulf the city for the next six months.
Historian Stephen Cresswell stresses the important role libraries played in
desegregation and sit-in campaigns across the south during the 1960s civil rights
movement in his article “The Last Days of Jim Crow in Southern Libraries.” The city of
Danville seemed to follow the model that Cresswell outlines of other southern states
when it came to their public library system.24 It wasn’t until around the 1920s that the
city established its first public library, which was for whites only. The black Grasty
branch followed sometime later, thus establishing a segregated library system around the
1930s.25 The reign of Jim Crow in southern public libraries was short, but powerful
nonetheless. Cresswell highlights a1961 investigation by the United States Commission
on Civil Rights which sent out 256 surveys to libraries across the South receiving federal
funds, and although only 109 surveys were returned, the results were illuminating. The
survey demonstrated that white libraries were open approximately thirty-three hours per
week, a stark contrast to the average fifteen hours a week in which the libraries for black
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citizens operated.26 The exact operating hours of the Grasty branch in Danville are
unknown, but considering the lack of resources and funding allotted to the black library,
such an assumption that the hours may have differed significantly is not unreasonable.
Additionally, the Commission also learned from the survey that white libraries averaged
28,000 book volumes compared to 4,400 volumes housed at the library for black
patrons.27 Given this information, the Danville percentage was a little higher than the
survey average, but not by much.
The sit-in movement that sparked from Greensboro triggered other sit-in protests
across the South, many of them occurring in public libraries and fueled by the NAACP.
Danville is close in proximity to Greensboro, the cities are less than an hour drive from
one another. Yet, the first library sit-in in Virginia took place in Petersburg that March,
just one month after the Woolworths sit-in. In Petersburg, unlike Danville, nearly all of
the demonstrators were arrested by police for refusing to leave the library. However,
similarly to the Danville sit-in which would follow one month later, Petersburg officials
also decided the best way to solve the problem was to close the public library. The
Petersburg sit-in was also constructed by the NAACP, though not the youth branch.28 The
similarities between Petersburg and Danville in combination with national trends
indicated from the results of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights survey places the
Danville story right in the middle of a larger struggle over the fight for public libraries
during the national civil rights movement. Like the Danville case, Cresswell writes that

26

Stephen Cresswell, “The Last Days of Jim Crow in Southern Libraries,” Libraries & Culture 31, no. 3/4
(Summer - Fall 1996): 558.
27
Stephen Cresswell, “The Last Days of Jim Crow in Southern Libraries,” Libraries & Culture 31, no. 3/4
(Summer - Fall 1996): 558.
28
Stephen Cresswell, “The Last Days of Jim Crow in Southern Libraries,” Libraries & Culture 31, no. 3/4
(Summer - Fall 1996): 558-559

24
by 1964 sit-in movements in libraries across the South were nearly over, as federal court
judges had continued to rule in favor of black demonstrators and eliminate de jure
segregation in public facilities.29 More importantly, the findings from Cresswell’s
research indicate white resistance tactics in Danville followed a broader national trend,
resisting desegregation just as fiercely as many other cities across the southern United
States.
Following the sit-ins, Danville City Council convened to debate an appropriate
response to the weekend’s events. The council enacted an ordinance that declared the
library system was currently “over-taxed by the demand of its patrons,” and, therefore,
would not be issuing new library cards to anyone, effective immediately.30 The council
also discussed the issue of the public parks, which the they voted unanimously would
only be available to those residing in the park’s immediate neighborhood, meaning parks
such as Ballou Parks were strictly limited to the white families who lived in its vicinity.31
The following Wednesday, NAACP lawyers Ruth Harvey Wood, Jerry Williams, and
others sued the City of Danville, city manager Temple, and librarian Robertson for black
access to the Memorial Library.32 Though the council had voted to shut down both public
library branches and restrict access to public parks, the NAACP chose to focus on the
library system, which was partially funded by black taxpayer money. Their lawsuit set
the tone for what would become months of turmoil and legal battles between the city
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council and the NAACP for the right to obtain equal access to public facilities and
exercise their 14th Amendment rights as United States citizens.
Nearly a decade after the Supreme Court overturned the “separate but equal”
doctrine with the Brown v. Board of Education decision, Danville’s white lawmakers still
saw it as their constitutional right to prevent black citizens from enjoying the same rights
and privileges granted to white citizens. Their fight over the library, in actuality, was a
fight to hold on to the system of white supremacy and power, which blatantly operated in
Danville. Refusing to face the legal realities of an end to Jim Crow and the tidal wave of
sit-in movements throughout the U.S. South, white leadership in Danville put up a
massive resistance to integration, portraying it as fueled by the NAACP whom they saw
as “outside agitators” seeking to ruin the city.33 Utilizing white power rhetoric that
portrayed Danville’s fight to hold on to the segregated library as an extension of the
Confederate cause during the Civil War, Danville’s power players of 1960 were
desperate to maintain an old order that was quickly slipping away.
Federal Judge Roby Thompson heard the NAACP’s case against the city of
Danville the following month and ordered the court to prepare an injunction ordering the
Memorial Library to service both white and black patrons.34 Shortly after the hearing
began, Judge Thompson asked Danville city attorney James Ferguson, “Is the City of
Danville operating a free public library with public funds and denying citizens use
because of race?” Purposefully denying black citizens equal access to public facilities
was a violation of the 14th Amendment, a precedent established by the Supreme Court in
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the Brown v. Board of Education lawsuit. Ferguson tried to argue that the city did allow
African Americans to hold library cards at the Memorial Library under certain
circumstances. There was in fact a small number of county educators who held cards at
the city Memorial Library, but Ferguson’s defense fell flat when the NAACP pointed out
that no black city residents were permitted to hold library cards at the white library. 35 It
was overwhelmingly clear that the city did not offer library cards to the black residents
whose tax dollars were supporting the library system. In his final defense of Danville,
Ferguson stated, “Every citizen understands undue mixing of the races can be potentially
explosive. That’s the one thing I’m trying to show here.”36 Despite this claim by
Ferguson, there was no evidence in recent city history that indicated an “explosive”
outcome would be the result of black and white citizens being together. The day the
students had sat in at the library, the city placed a policeman at the door just in case
violence broke out, yet nothing happened. Even at Ballou Park, when the black teens
were harassed by white teenagers, events remained peaceful.37 Judge Thompson then
gave the city an option: if they could assure him that black residents would be allowed
full access to the library then he would not need to grant the injunction forcing
integration. In spite of the olive branch offered by the judge, James Ferguson refused to
concede his position. He retorted, “We have no authority to speak for the legislative body
of Danville.”
In writing his decision, one key point the judge included was that both public
libraries were supported by the tax dollars of white and black citizens of the city. It was
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clear that the tax dollars supporting the library system were primarily going towards the
Memorial Library, as the whites-only branch held nearly four times as many books and
was in the middle of an expansion at the time. Granting the injunction, Judge Thompson
found that the black citizens of Danville had been denied access to the Memorial Library
solely because of their race, which was a violation of the protections given to American
citizens under the Constitution. Therefore, all black citizens in Danville must be granted
use of the Memorial Library.38 Thompson’s decision falls in line with other civil rights
lawsuits and court cases filed throughout the 1950s and 1960s.
Adamant that compliance with Judge Thompson’s decision was not the proper
solution, the council held a vote on whether or not attorney Ferguson should submit an
appeal of Judge Thompson’s decision, and the legislative body unanimously voted to
proceed with litigation. The council also voted in a five-to-three decision they would put
the fate of the library’s future up to a public a referendum vote.39 Though the vote would
not have any legal binding on the council, it was to serve as a guide for what the city
supposedly wanted to do about the library issue. For those on the council who wanted to
refuse integration at all costs, the vote seemed likely to go in their favor as the numbers
of black citizens in the city registered and eligible to vote was exponentially lower than
that of the white citizens.40 Dr. Lurton Arey, James Catlin, and Charles Womack were
the three council members opposed to the referendum vote.41 These men did not classify
themselves as integrationists, but they did seem to indicate more of a willingness to
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follow federal orders than other councilmembers like John Carter. It is likely their stance
represented a wanting of a peaceful transition into a desegregated library system, as many
were concerned a chaotic fight would deter businesses from wanting to settle in the city
and negatively affect the economic interests of white citizens. This concern was indicated
by concerned citizens during town hall-style meetings later in the summer.42 If the
councilmen had merely had a desire to follow federal order, there should have been a
push earlier than the sit-in attempt to follow federal court decisions from the Brown v.
Board case or an interest shown in desegregating more public facilities, like school, in the
aftermath of the library integration. These men were not staunch segregationists like
some of the members of city council, but that does not mean they desired an integrated
library or that they supported black civil rights in Danville.

The referendum ballot would present five options to the voters, and issue that later
would come to complicate the vote even more. Rather than have two options, one to close
the library to all or one to open the library to all, the five options seem to further indicate
a city council split over what solution to come to regarding the library. The white public
would see themselves as having a variety of options to choose from, but the referendum
vote would not actually have any legal weight no matter the outcome. The five ballot
options as presented to the voters were:
1. Close the library system.
2. Close the library system if it appears that private library facilities will be
reasonably available.
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3. Open the library to all citizens.
4. Permit the Council to work out a “modified plan” to keep the library open.
5. Close the library building for public use and dispense books by
bookmobile.43
There is significance in the various options presented to the Danville voters in regard to
the “library issue”44. As the legislative body in Danville, the council could have decided
to make the decision for the city and not have gone to the trouble of holding a vote. 1960
was an election year for the council, and it is likely that many of the members saw the
vote as a way to win favor with voters. In their staunch resistance to integration, language
that glorified Danville as the last capitol of the Confederacy, and demonization of the
NAACP as an outside force dictating what to do with their own city, many on the council
sought to convince white voters that the only logical choice was to close the library rather
than integrate. It is also likely that holding a referendum vote would serve as strong
argument in court if there were more court battles regarding integration of public
facilities. Regardless of the exact reason, or a combination of the above, it was clear the
all-white council was only vying for the white vote. Whites comprised the overwhelming
majority of voters in Danville, as only 6% of eligible black citizens were registered to
vote in Danville.45 This meant the decision of whether or not to allow black access to the
library would be decided by a nearly entirely white electorate who were overwhelmingly
opposed to integration. As the weeks would pass leading up to the referendum, rhetoric
put forth by the council made it clear that the black vote was not considered important or
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significant when it came to talks over the referendum vote or outcome of the public
library.
The council’s continuous meetings, voting, and public forums between the sit-in
and the end to the library battle in September represent a governing body scrambling to
solidify a racial order which had never been openly challenged in Danville. Even with six
years of the federal courts supporting a national civil rights movement for African
Americans, segregation in Danville operated as a daily function of life for both white and
black citizens. Little to no challenges of the laws or social norms occurred prior to 1960,
cementing the ideas of segregation and white power in the city. The sit-in at the library
and following NAACP lawsuit forced the city council and whites in Danville to confront
and clarify a shifting racial order that had always been assumed solid because of its
reinforcement by local laws. This order had been shaken by not only the sit-in movement,
but the federal court’s decision to force integration. Placing a referendum in front of
voters would create the illusion whites in Danville had a voice in whether or not to follow
the federal court’s orders and reinforced the idea of the white role in decision-making for
Danville. For leaders like Carter an Wheatley, the solution to their problem was to
proceed with a private library facility for whites without waiting for the results of the
referendum vote, as a private facility would be out of government reach and maintain the
black exclusionary atmosphere that already existed in the city. The decision to proceed
with the private library before conducting the referendum vote demonstrates
segregationists’ confidence that the public would overwhelmingly vote to keep the
libraries closed rather than integrate. Ultimately, both the referendum vote and private
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library proposal were attempts at explicitly maintaining the system of white power and
black exclusion in Danville.

Certainly to the disbelief of Carter and Wheatley, white leadership and
community members were not all in agreement when it came to how to handle the library
issue. The council’s decision to include five options on the referendum vote for the
library is the first indicator of a division. In theory, the vote only asked two questions whether or not the citizens of Danville desired to keep the library open to all or close it
permanently rather than integrate. Councilman Carter vocalized this idea, and claimed
that the inclusion of five options was too confusing for the public.46 The variety of
options may have been an indicator of discontent among the council, and the options
were there to appease the three members who were initially opposed to a referendum
vote. Council members like James Catlin who seemed to favor an open library system
would have known a private library would ultimately mean black exclusion, a move away
from the national trend of expanding civil rights for African Americans. The black
electorate would be voting on this referendum as well, even if their turnout would be a
fraction of the white vote due to voter suppression in Danville. Those on the council who
were more moderate, like James Catlin, Mozelle Fairer, and Charles Womack may have
seen the options as a way to include black citizens in the vote. More likely, the permanent
closure of a widely-used public resource would signal the end of a free community
service that symbolled literacy, education, and progress. Closing the public library system
would certainly not make Danville an attractive location for industry or growth. Even for
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white citizens who did not consider themselves integrationists, they realized the closure
of the public library solely for the purpose of refusing to allow black patrons might
negatively impact the white community in the process by removing a free resource many
of them benefited from and risking future financial ventures in the city that could benefit
the economy.
A small group of white citizens expressed their discontent at the closure of the
public library by sending a petition to the city council requesting the libraries reopen. The
original petition contained thirty-one signatures of current Memorial Library cardholders
or their relatives, and the group of signees committed to gathering more community
support.47 Led by Dr. Martin Doneslon Jr., a noteworthy white citizen in Danville, his
name along with the other signees were listed in the Register’s run of the story for all the
public to see. The petition itself stated that the group believed the public library was
“essential to the cultural life and to the general growth and progress of our community…”
When Donelson was asked if the group favored integration, replied with “no comment.”48
After a short time, the group’s petition number grew by 300 names, and the updated
petition was sent to mayor Julian Stinson.49 The additional individuals who added their
names to the petition were all “leading white citizens” in the city, representing a white
body that was adamantly against the library closure.50 The group as a whole prioritized a
functioning public library as a necessity in a growing city like Danville over their
personal feelings towards integration. The aim of this group is important to understanding
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the lack of uniformity among white citizens in Danville, yet also represents that whites
with these views did not hold the majority of power in the city. Even though over 300
white petitioners asked the council to reopen the library, their request was ignored.
Individuals wishing to create a private library facility formed an official body to
govern the project. Named the Steering Committee, leaders included former House of
Delegates representative Chase Stuart Wheatley and current councilman John Carter.
Robert Zellner later described Wheatley’s role in the library issue as that of a “political
boss” in Danville. Zellner portrayed Wheatley as a man jaded and bitter about his lack of
nomination for a congressional seat following his first term and thus was searching for
power in an effort to avoid showing further weakness.51 John Carter, the most right-wing
member of city council, held steadfast views on maintaining segregation and keeping the
federal government out of Danville’s affairs.52 Carter held a law degree from the
University of Virginia and by 1960 had been on the council for two years. Wheatly and
Carter were the most vocal public figures against integration during the debates over the
library issue, and their leadership role in creating a private library option was not
surprising. If anyone else on the council or in the public saw it as a conflict of interest for
the councilman Carter to take on such a role, the Register certainly didn’t report it. At the
first public committee meeting Wheatly gave assurance that as soon as a charter could be
obtained, the private library would be moving ahead.53
The difference in opinions among white citizens over the creation of a private
library provides insights into the white citizen’s values and the reception of these ideas
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from those in power. Physically and financially, it would have been much easier to follow
Judge Thompson’s orders and open the public libraries to any patron regardless of race.
The creation of a private library would require a new facility, new books, money to pay
salaries, and more. This money would all have to be comprised of private donations or
fees, and was set to cost thousands of dollars. None of that money, even if privately
sourced, would be necessary if the city council had chosen to comply with Judge
Thompson’s orders. There was also significant white support in the community for the
continued functioning of a public library despite the integration that would come with it.
This illustrates that powerful and influential white leadership in Danville was not
concerned with a practical approach to the library issue or the voices of leading white
citizens who held opinions contrary to their own. Councilman Carter’s position on both
the council and Steering Committee further supports the idea that Danville’s white
leadership was desperate to hold on to their positions of status and power and
demonstrated a refusal to compromise at all with black equality in the city. Power and
control was at stake, and white leadership like John Carter were desperate to hold on to
all they could as any compromise with black citizens or the federal government would
take away from the complete social and political control white citizens in Danville had
enjoyed for their entire lives. Even a small amount of black social or political power that
may arise from the defeat over the library segregation would bring a tremendous loss to
white power in the city.

An open forum was held for city council candidates shortly after the counsel
closed the libraries. Though only half of the candidates participated, the crowd of 250
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people heard the prospective councilmen (and one councilwoman) talk on a variety of
issues, but the issue that dominated the night was the public library.54 It was during this
public forum that fear over federal intervention and forced “race mixing” became clear as
the candidates boldly declared their feelings regarding the federal integration order and
the closure of the public library. W. McCubbins stated that he was “absolutely opposed to
mixing of the races in any way, shape, or form.” Supposedly meaning no disrespect to his
“colored friends”, McCubbins declared it was not the African American community he
was fighting, but rather the NAACP “which gives orders from New York.”55 In
portraying the NAACP as a northern outside organization attempting to dictate how the
small southern city of Danville should operate, rather than the local advocacy group it
really was, McCubbins’ statements mirrored the ideas expressed by Carter and Wheatly.
Councilman hopeful Fletcher Harris also echoed these sentiments, claiming his issue was
with federal overreach and a violation of white citizen’s constitutional rights. Harris
stated, “I am opposed to the acceptance of federal doctrines which are in conflict with the
Constitution of the United States…I believe in the rights of the minority, but the rule of
the majority…It is my opinion that the majority of the citizens of Danville would prefer
to see the library and parks closed rather than integrated…”56
If Harris truly believed in the legal rights of the minority, then he should have had
no issue understanding the constitutionality of Judge Thompson’s integration order,
which had clearly been influenced by the Brown v. Board decision. Additionally, Harris’
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statements regarding the “rule of the majority” only consider the supposed interest of the
white citizens of Danville. While it is true that Danville’s racial demographic was
majority white, blacks in the city constituted more than 30% percent of the city’s 47,000
residents.57 The insinuation of Harris’ entire statement is that the rule of the majority was
inherently what should be considered “constitutional,” even if those ideas did not actually
follow federal interpretation of the United States Constitution. What Harris and other
candidates supported was actually a denial of constitutional rights for the African
American citizens of Danville, but their segregationist rhetoric was an attempt to appeal
to white voters in the city with language that appeared to be common sense. If the
Constitution supported majority rule, then why should white citizens, who comprised a
majority in Danville (albeit a slim one) be expected to give up their rights in order to give
more rights to black citizens? Harris’ arguments were meant to appeal to a sense of anger
and denial within white voters to motivate them to go to the polls and vote for him and
councilman while also voting against any form of library integration.
At the same public forum, several white citizens expressed concern that the
closure of the public library would be a deterrent for new industry in the city, therefore
minimizing Danville’s growth and economic potential. When taking questions from the
public about Danville’s future, Dr. Ralph Landes asked, “If libraries, parks, and schools
were closed, how would we get new industry?”58 Catlin and Harris both responded that
the question of schools was not an issue in the current campaign and a bit “premature,” as
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it was the issue of libraries and parks at stake.59 Landes’ question was actually quite
relevant to the current issue, rather than “premature” as Catlin and Harris deemed it.
Prince William County Schools in Virginia had closed rather than integrate only about a
year prior, and potential school closures along with the libraries seemed a natural
concern. Citizens in Danville would have heard all about Prince William’s closure, and it
would seem to follow that if the library closed to avoid integration this might apply to a
federally ordered school integration as well.
Candidate Barker responded to Dr. Landes’ question by commenting, “I believe
we had industry before we had a library.”60 Even though current councilmen and those
running for the position seemed unconcerned about the negative impacts that the closure
of the library might have on industry in the city, a change of heart came quickly. The
story of Danville’s library closure and eventual reopening in its vertical-integration style
made the city a national embarrassment, and leadership in Danville was condemned by
Time, The New York Times, the American Library Association, and the Wilson Library
Bulletin.61 Richard Bourne, a professor the University of Baltimore who grew up in
Danville wrote in an essay years later that the pressure of the library issue potentially
hindering industry in the city was eventually what led city leadership to backdown,
claiming that businesses did not want “to move to the backwater Danville would
become” if they continued closures of public facilities for the sake of segregation.62
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Robert Zellner, a field secretary for the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee,
claimed that it was the threat of industry removal, not the federal judge’s orders, which
eventually motivated the council to reopen the public library on an integrated basis.63
Another obstacle that made white citizens hesitant about a private library were the
costs of such a project. In June a public letter was published in the Register that
condemned the idea of a private library for many reasons, but a key reason being the cost.
The anonymous author wrote that the current public library was valued at more than
500,000 dollars, and cost 74,000 dollars a year to operate. Councilman Carter took
exception to this statement, calling it “irresponsible.”64 Carter claimed that the author of
the letter was overstating the amount it costs to run the library, and that in reality it would
only cost about half of what the city was currently spending on the library. He also
pointed out that the current operational cost of the public system included supporting a
book mobile and the Grasty branch, neither of which would be operated with the
proposed private facility for whites. Carter vocalized that funds for the library would be
provided through private donors and fees for holding a library card.65 He also proposed
the way to fill the private library with books would be to simply purchase them from the
city’s library, which he expected to remain closed.66 Thus, Carter’s plan was to fill the
new private library with the books from the former libraries which had been purchased
with the taxpayer money of both black and white citizens. Carter’s seeming entitlement to
the city’s resources demonstrates a complete disregard for the black community in
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Danville. Not only did he feel they did not deserve access to public educational facilities
in the same way white citizens did, he found it totally acceptable to take the books that
had been purchased with black taxpayer money for his own white library. Carter’s push
for a private facility also demonstrates an attempt to go beyond federal government reach,
believing that the government could not mandate a privately funded facility to uphold
black citizen’s 14th Amendment rights.
In the same letter, the presumed white author also takes issue with the five options
that would be presented to the voters in the coming weeks, stating that the question is
merely, “Do you or do you not, desire a library in Danville?”67 Wheatly, who “sharply”
took issue with the simplification of the library question, stated the real question was
whether or not the city of Danville would conced to the NAACP. He also stated, “…it
must be the question of whether you approve of integration or segregation.” Wheatley
continues, “If a person says he is for segregation, yet, because he is unwilling to disturb
his comfort or undergo some inconvenience, trouble, and sacrifice, he permits the things
to happen that bring about integration. He is giving only lip service to segregation and
might as well just say he is for integration.”68 Wheatley’s quote enlightens the true intent
behind the creation of a private library and a forceful fight against the federal
government. As much as the leading segregationists in the city wanted to claim the fight
over the library was about not conceding to the NAACP or advocating for their
constitutional rights, the reality of the situation was simple: white leadership in Danville
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could not grasp a future in which they would have to intertwine their lives publicly with
people of color.
The Danville Library Foundation held its own public meeting following the city
council’s public forum. The crowd of about 200 people once again heard arguments to
demand their “constitutional rights” and refusal to surrender to the NAACP when it came
to desegregating the public library. The meeting was predominately led by Wheatley and
councilman Carter, and both heavily emphasized there should be absolutely no
compromise with the NAACP whatsoever. 69
“You cannot appease the NAACP,” Carter said. “If we comprise this thing, we will have
to face it again…” Carter, though steadfast in his fight to hang on to white power in the
city, knew the reality of the situation the Danville city government was facing. Cities
across the South had been facing federal integration orders for years by 1960, and it is
likely Carter knew that his best bet for holding the city was to continue to resist federal
integration measures. Once one public facility was forced to integrate, it likely wouldn’t
be long before more followed. Carter continued his beratement of the NAACP by
claiming the “militant group” had only come to the city of Danville to bring “strife, racial
trouble, distrust, and hate,” ignoring the groups obvious local ties and leadership.70 Carter
also rebutted Judge Thompson’s argument that black citizens paid taxes and were
therefore entitled to the library by stating that even though blacks constituted around 44
percent of the population, whites paid 95 percent of the taxes. In portraying an image
where whites in the city “generously and unbegrudgingly” carried the financial burden of
non-tax paying blacks, Carter insisted white leadership in the city had “provided equal

69
70

“Vote Urged For Private Library And Against NAACP Appeasement,” Register, June 1st, 1960.
“Vote Urged For Private Library And Against NAACP Appeasement,” Register, June 1st, 1960.

41
facilities, and in some cases superior” ones for African Americans.71 Even if it was true
that whites paid 95 percent of the city’s taxes, it was likely because African Americans in
Danville were not able to hold more than menial jobs, and thus brought in a significantly
lower income than white families.72 Carter’s arguments continued to build on this
segregationist rhetoric as he sought to have white voters in Danville buy in to the
argument that they were the ones carrying the black community on their backs, and
therefore owed them nothing. Carter continuously resounded the message that whites in
Danville would pay the price for black equality if they gave up on the fight to maintain
their power in the city. Any compromise with the black citizens, NAACP demands, or
federal government would lead to the downfall of white social and political power in the
city. This downfall would affect men like Carter the most, and it would be impossible for
him to maintain his position if white voters were not supporting him.
The mid-June city council election brought in more than 6,000 voters, with 4,427
people casting a vote for one of the five options listed on the referendum. As expected,
the majority of those votes, 2,829, were cast for the referendum options that would lead
to a permanent closure of the public library system.73 The day following the elections the
front page of the newspaper contained the headlines, “Citizens Would Close Library
Rather Than Integrate: Voters Pick Catlin, McCubbins, Anderson, Harris, and Daniels.”
The first two lines of the left column of the article immediately reiterated the title, stating,
“Danville voters Tuesday refused to surrender the Last Capitol of the Confederacy to the
NAACP. By a vote of 2,829 to 1,598, local citizens voted to close the public library
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system outright rather than integrate it.”74 Councilman Carter was quick to release a
statement immediately after the vote count had been announced. Again touting claims
about constitutional rights, Carter stated, “I am pleased the people of the City of Danville
will not compromise their constitutional rights with the NAACP.”75
Drawing once again on language that elevated Danville’s “legacy” as the last
capitol of the Confederacy, the Register’s celebratory tone declared victory over the
NAACP which had already been established as an outsider force. Prior to the referendum
and newspaper article, leaders in the fight to maintain segregation had been vocal in their
disdain for the NAACP and drawn on rhetoric that glorified Danville’s position during
the civil war in order to empower whites who still believed in Danville’s white
supremacist legacy and to wage war against those who sought to integrate the public
library. Without explicitly stating such either in the paper or by the city’s leading
segregationists, if the Sutherlin Mansion represented Danville’s glory days of the Civil
War, then the NAACP represented the northern forces who overtook the South, a sore
spot for post-Civil War states who were forced to give up their lifestyle of slave
ownership. Indicative in the newspaper writings and declarations of Wheatley and
Councilman Carter, it is almost as if there is Confederate redemption in the closure of the
libraries. Danville was forced to surrender to the Union at the end of the Civil War, but
their refusal to comply with the federal government’s orders of integration was a victory
in their eyes.
In addition to the referendum vote, the new city council was decided in the June
14th election as well. The results of the council vote brought in three new members,
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George Anderson, Fletcher Harris, and George Daniels, with sitting members Catlin and
McCubbins reelected to their seats.76 Interestingly enough, vocal supporter of a public
library James Catlin received the highest amount of votes for city council members.
McCubbins, one of the most outspoken candidates against a public library if it meant
integration, received the second highest vote count.77 The new council was scheduled to
convene in September 1st, yet even with the results of the referendum vote and a new
council body looming shortly ahead, the library issue would remain a hot debate amongst
the council members for weeks to come.

On September 13th, the debate over the library issue in Danville came to a quick
close. The new city council elected to re-open the public libraries in a 5-4 vote.78 The
decision was a shock after months of meetings, bitter debates, and all the hype over the
referendum vote in June. There was a catch to the facilities’ reopening though; the library
would not have any chairs. In a move of “vertical integration”, library patrons would only
have the option to stand if they decided to conduct research at the library or check out a
book.79 This was an effort to prevent black and white patrons from sitting amongst one
another or sharing the same space for too long, something that would be one more clear
affront to segregated order in Danville. Councilman John Carter was livid about the
decision. Not only was the decision an offense to the majority of citizens who had voted
to close the libraries in the referendum vote (although everyone knew it was not legally
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binding) was second only to his offense that black citizens had gained access to the
sacred ground of the Confederate memorial building. In reference to the Sutherlin
Mansion, Carter stated, “ It’s a memorial to the brave men in grey who died in the second
war of independence that the constitutional right of local self-government might prevail.”
A compromise with the Federal government, he continued, “will not, I think, set well
with the people.” Regardless of Carter’s complaints and the objections of
councilmembers Anderson, McCubbins, and Harris, the day after the council vote U.S.
Wester District Court Judge Ted Dalton ordered the Danville public libraries to reopen to
all, on an integrated basis, the following day.80
The bitter debate over the integration of the public libraries was the first of its
kind that Danville had ever experienced. The chaos and conflict were something the city
and its white leadership had never had to face before, as segregated order had never been
challenged in such a blatant and intense way. In the end, these first-time problems that
city council attempted to reconcile with the legality of segregation, hiding away through
private avenues, or letting the people decide in the name of democracy were to no avail.
It was a victory for black citizens and the NAACP to be sure, but a small one when
compared to the vast amount that remained unchanged in Danville immediately following
the library integration. Schools, restaurants, and essentially all other aspects of public and
private life remained segregated for the next two years. Between 1961 to 1962, small
changes would take place in Danville, but nothing would compare to the firestorm that
was coming in the summer of 1963. Black civil rights activists were preparing to take on
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a new means of demanding their rights, but this time institutions of white power would be
much more adaptable and forceful than they had been during the library fight of 1960.
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The Years Between, 1961-1963
Civil rights efforts in Danville in the years following the library desegregation
slowed, yet never fully came to a halt. The NAACP and black citizenry of Danville had
been granted a significant legal win in regards to their demands of city leadership, and it
was anticipated that the library would only be the first step towards a fully integrated city.
A new city council was seated in the municipal building during the 1960 election, not
realizing in two short years the battle that would arise in Danville would bring a violence
and intensity far beyond that which the fight over the library had stirred up. The
integration of the public library and the city’s tactics of “vertical integration”
characterized the final chapter of 1960, but Danville’s civil rights story was only
beginning.
Events in Danville continued to intersect with and be influenced by the larger,
national civil rights movement. On May 7th, 1961, the Freedom Riders came through
Danville after embarking south on their campaign trail.81 Organized by James Farmer,
national director of the Core For Racial Equality (CORE), a mixed group of white and
black activists trained in Washington D.C. for a few days before loading themselves onto
a bus and planning to drive throughout the South to put segregation to the test. The
Supreme Court had recently handed down a ruling for Boynton v. Virginia decreeing
segregated lunch counters, bathrooms, and waiting rooms were unconstitutional. The
Freedom Riders had set out to see for themselves if this ruling had any real affect in cities
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across the South, and they planned to challenge any facility they saw resisting the court
order.82 Danville was the last Virginia city to be visited by the group after departing from
Richmond. A week after their stop in Danville the group headed to Birmingham,
Alabama, when member of the Ku Klux Klan threw a fire bomb into the bus and attacked
riders as they exited.83 Although the stop by the Freedom Riders does not appear to have
caused any initial outburst in the city, their visit to Danville marks a historical crosssection where Danville’s civil rights story interacts with that of the national movement’s
timeline.
In addition to the role that Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee would
come to play in the Danville civil rights movement, other national organizations saw the
city as a beneficial place to set up operations. Led by Martin Luther King Jr., the
Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) also decided Danville was an ideal
location to establish an official partnership. The Danville Progressive Christian
Association (DCPA) became an official affiliate of the SCLC in 1962 under the
leadership of a group of local church leaders. Reverend Lawrence Campbell, Reverend
Wendell Chase, A.I. Dunlap, and Julius Adams joined together to activate the
organization, and they collectively decided Reverend Chase would be the right man to
serve as president of the organization.84 The close partnership between the SCLC and
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DCPA would lead to three visits to Danville by Martin Luther King Jr. in the following
year, all of which helped ignite and sustain the local protest movement.
Civil rights leader Martin Luther King Jr., made his way to Danville in late March
after visiting several other small Virginia cities and delivered a speech at the city
auditorium to the estimated 2,500 people in attendance. He spoke of freedom for black
citizens in Danville, boldly declaring that justice would “flow over Danville like a stream
from mighty waters.”85 Once he concluded his speech and headed outside, an angry white
mob was waiting for him out on the street. King was rushed to his car and driven to his
hotel an hour away in Greensboro, North Carolina, where he had been forced to stay
since none of the city hotels would allow him to book a room. After returning to his hotel
room once leaving Danville, Reverend Lawrence Campbell recalled that King had a gash
in his side where a woman had tried to stab him as he left the auditorium that day.86 This
visit by King would only be his first of three in 1963, and though it did not directly stir
protestors in Danville to action, his visit certainly fits into the chronology of events that
took place in building momentum for the Danville movement which would spark in the
late spring of 1963.
The final event that occurred leading up to the Danville protest movement was the
Children’s March in Birmingham. On May 2nd, thousands of black schoolchildren and
left their classrooms to flood Kelly Ingram Park in an effort to protest ongoing
segregation and discrimination in Alabama. They were joined by bystanders and other
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protestors as the days went on, gathering momentum that would propel the event onto the
national stage. The children and protestors were met with intense police violence,
beatings, dog attacks and arrests.87 The Birmingham story made headlines across
America, the front page of the Danville Register included. “Nearly 800 Negroes Jailed in
Birmingham” was written boldly across the paper on May 3rd, and the article went on for
several pages describing the group of young protestors in Birmingham anxious to go to
jail for the civil rights cause. The article also included details of police action, such as the
police arresting demonstrators for parading without a permit, and the usage of fire hoses
and police dogs.
The significance of the Birmingham civil rights story to that of Danville is
twofold. First, the Birmingham movement directly influenced civil rights leadership in
Danville to spark their own civil rights protest. Even though civil rights action was being
taken by black city leadership, such as an omnibus segregation suit in 1962 and the visit
by Martin Luther King Jr. in March 1963, it did not appear that a protest movement was
imminent. The events of Birmingham and their heavy reporting by the Register are what
ignited the city’s first direct action protests. Secondly, actions by the Danville Police
Department closely mirrored the tactics taken on by the Birmingham Police Department,
specifically tactics that were widely publicized in the local paper. The Danville police
chief, Chief McCain, was even characterized as a “Bull Connor type” by one of the
SNCC activists that came to Danville that summer to aid in organization of the
movement.88 It is unlikely that Chief McCain came up with such tactics of massive
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resistance and violence on his own, but rather procured the ideas from Chief Bull
Connor’s handling of the Birmingham situation. When Danville police began mass
arrests of protestors, they too arrested people for the violation of parading without a
permit, and utilized the local fire department and police dogs as a form of crowd control.
The similarities are too great to be explained by mere coincidence: usage of these
Birmingham tactics in the city of Danville was intentional.
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Danville, 1963
May
“The chief beat me; while many others had concussions. One woman’s breast burst open
and the demonstrators were beaten by white, deputized garbage collectors, state troopers,
and the Danville Police…demonstrators were hosed down to the ground and washed
away like trash.”
-Gloria Campbell, demonstrator, SCLC activist, and wife of Reverend Campbell recalling
the night of Bloody Monday, June 10th, 1963.
The 1960 fight for the public library was a battle fought mostly behind closed
doors between the all-white city council and NAACP leadership. Though the public was
highly aware, and even participated in the referendum vote, no public demonstrations
took place outside of the original sit-ins on April 3rd. As sit-ins and protests movements
swept through the South in the early 1960s, Danville’s civil rights fight continued to take
place in distant courtrooms. Though there was incremental change occurring in Danville
it was slow, and easily ignored by white city leadership. In the two years since the library
fight, segregation in Danville remained firm. Entering into 1963, black individuals were
still barred from white-owned restaurants and private businesses, and there were no black
retail associates, firemen, police officers, city councilmen, or other public officials in the
city.89
In the late spring of 1963, the Children’s March in Birmingham, Alabama,
sparked a new phase of the Danville civil rights story, and an inspired Danville Christian
Progressive Association began planning public protest marches in the downtown area.
The now public movement during the hot summer of 1963 would cause Danville’s white
power structures to adapt quickly in order to confront and diminish the perceived threat
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that was suddenly right in front of them. Hanging on to segregation in a court room was
one thing, but managing hundreds of people marching downtown to demand equal rights
was completely different. In order to create a wall of powerful white resistance, the
Danville city administration, police department, and city judge all joined together to
construct a barrier to the city’s civil rights movement that was so overwhelming it was
nearly impossible to overcome.

Daily reporting in the Register captured the brutality of the events in Birmingham.
Police dogs attacked young children and teens in the local park and police chief Bull
Connor ordered the fire department to spray down protesters with powerful fire hoses that
pushed them against buildings and washed them down the street.90 However, despite
these brutal events, the paper continued to praise what it considered an appropriate and
measured response by the city’s law enforcement. “Nearly 800 Negroes Jailed In
Birmingham” read the headlines of the Register the morning after the first demonstration.
“Pupils Skip Classes To State March In Renewed Racial Demonstrations” was the
subtitle, immediately identifying that most of those arrested were indeed underage
schoolchildren.91 The lengthy article states on the front page that “there was no violence”,
yet the pages that follow describe the usage of water hoses and marchers being bitten by
police dogs. Rather than declare these events as violent, which it was, the paper wrote
that the police merely “obliged” the protestors after their reported chants of “Bring on the
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water. Bring on the dogs.”92 The Register’s classification of the police response in
Birmingham as an appropriate measure are indicative of a white public perception in
Danville that supported a certain amount of police brutality as an acceptable means of
crowd control when dealing with civil rights protestors. These same ideas would manifest
about Danville later in the summer, when police became increasingly violent towards
demonstrators in the downtown area.
The stories of both Birmingham and Danville are similar in many ways, and the
tactics employed by both civil rights protestors and the police closely resembled one
another. There are a few likely explanations for this. First, at the time of the Birmingham
march, Danville had yet to experience a city-wide protest movement like the one that
would follow the Children’s Crusade. Until the late spring of 1963, city leadership had
only faced their battles in a courtroom. The outcome of discrimination lawsuits filed by
the NAACP brought about the desegregation of certain public facilities, such as parks,
the library system, and city transportation.93 The direct protest action which would begin
in Danville at the end of May was the first time Danville city police and city council were
faced with the physical bodies of hundreds of black citizens who were through with
tolerating the city’s racist practices. Once faced with such a large-scale protest, the
actions taken by the DPD and city council mirrored the events that took place in
Birmingham during the Children’s March and were reported in the Register. Just like
Birmingham, protestors were arrested on charges of parading without a permit, parents
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were arrested for their demonstrating juveniles, and the police chief brought in the local
fire department to hose down demonstrators when they refused to clear the scene.94 Due
to the national fame of Birmingham and the reporting of events in the local paper, is
highly likely that the police chief in Danville garnered his knowledge of Birmingham
police tactics from these newspaper reports and utilized them in Danville.
Another similarity is found in the leaders of the police departments of both
Danville and Birmingham. In Birmingham, police chief Theophilus Eugene Connor
earned his fame as an obstinate man with no interest in serving the black citizens of the
city in the same way he served those who were white. Born in 1897, he moved to
Birmingham from Selma in 1922. Prior to his reputation of police brutality, Connor was
known as an unwavering opponent of labor unions in Birmingham’s industries.95 An hard
and unsympathetic man, he became known as Bull Connor. In Danville, police chief
Eugene McCain has been described by many in the decades that followed his tenure as
one who was a “Bull Connor figure,” and resembled the Birmingham police chief in both
thought and action.96 Considering Chief McCain took a similar approach to the Danville
protestors as Bull Connor did to those in Birmingham, commentary such as this does not
seem far off. There is not much known about McCain’s personal life, but through his
preferred tactics, a picture of a man who thought similarly to Birmingham’s police chief
emerges. Whether Chief McCain was a hardened man like Bull Connor, or simply
wished to mimic his tactics for a variety of potential reasons, the steps Chief McCain
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took during the movement closely mirror those from Birmingham, and demonstrate an
exercise of white power through violence during the Danville civil rights movement.
These similarities between Birmingham and Danville are important for
contextualizing the city of Danville and where it fits in the larger civil rights narrative.
Though there had been work put in to further civil rights efforts in Danville, an actual
civil rights movement in the southern Virginia city was by no means inevitable. The quiet
happenings through 1961 and 1962 gave the appearance that change was taking on a
slower pace, thus the broader protest movement that occurred in 1963 was an unexpected
shock to the city and its leadership. A close examination of the rhetoric taken on by the
Register after the Birmingham movement lends insights into the ways in which the white
public and leadership would treat their own civil rights protestors. The contempt at the
display for equal rights not only shocked white power structures in Danville, but enraged
them.97

After two years of taking small steps towards racial progress in Danville and
garnering inspiration from the events in Birmingham, the Danville Christian Progressive
Association (DCPA) planned the first direct protest march in Danville. The first
demonstration was held on May 31st and led by DCPA leader Reverend Alexander
Dunlap, who was the Reverend at the Saint Paul African Methodist Episcopal Church.98
There is little evidence of the first several days of the protest, as the local media and
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leadership largely ignored it.99 What can be gathered, however, is that there were around
250 black citizens in attendance, many of them young adults and high school
teenagers.100 The marches took place in the downtown area, and demonstrators would
leave from High Street Baptist Church and march in columns, chanting and singing, until
they reached the large stone steps of the municipal building. Once there, they would
climb the steps and begin singing songs of freedom and equality, two things they
desperately wanted white city leadership to give them.101
The municipal building on Patton Street holds many of the same offices today as
it did in 1963. The building houses the city manager’s office, clerk’s office, and other
offices for city administration. This building was the target spot of most of the protests
that summer, not only because it was the location of the city’s administrative offices, but
it was also connected by a concrete courtyard to both the city courthouse, police station,
and jail. The combination of these buildings created a hub of activity for the summerlong protests. Marchers would head to Patton Street to demand time with the mayor and
city manager, protest the mass arrests of their comrades at the jail, and later attend their
court hearings all at the same central location. Some of the most iconic pictures of
protestors from that summer show groups of demonstrators piled along the municipal
building steps and protesting in front of the court house, taking advantage of the elevated
surface to put on a show of singing and clapping. Just to the right across the concrete
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courtyard sits the courthouse, and a Latin phrase dedicated to justice is carved in stone
above the doorway. A pathway between the courthouse and municipal building leads
directly behind the courthouse to the city jail, a trifecta that served the police department
just as well as it served the civil rights marchers. Protesters could easily be dragged from
the steps of the municipal building, booked into a jail cell, and pulled later for their court
dates all within the same city complex.

The first demonstration of the protest movement in Danville occurred on May
31th, 1963. Reverend Alexander Dunlap let a group of about 250 demonstrators to go
marching in downtown Danville.102 Accounts of the first days of the movement are
difficult to find, and what does exist is lacking in detail. However, first-hand accounts of
the movement throughout the summer are largely consistent as far as the tactics and
methods used by the protestors as they began the city’s first-ever direct protest civil rights
movement. Groups would congregate either at High Street Baptist Church or Bible Way
Church in the city and use them as a base to organize before marching downtown.
Reverend Chase and Reverend Campbell served these two churches, respectively, and
were key leaders during the Danville movement. High Street Baptist sits atop a hill in the
downtown area, with clear views of the Dan River to the left and the downtown business
section directly in front. It is a short walk from the church’s doors to the city municipal
building. Bible Way is still in the city, though quite a bit further away. Demonstrators
would still march to and from Bible Way, or run there for cover to avoid police brutality
and arrests, but from all accounts it seems High Street was the most utilized.
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Demonstrators would march in straight columns, carry signs, and chant and sing songs of
freedom as they marched to the downtown city hall steps. Once there, they would crowd
the steps and continue their chanting and singing, an event which quickly gained the
attention of the public, police, and city officials.103
The first several days of the protest passed peacefully; there were no arrests and
no violence. City officials considered the marching a nuisance to downtown life that
disrupted the flow of traffic.104 The lack of arrests in those first days of protests are
significant. The police did not make any arrests because the protestors were not breaking
any laws. Marching, singing, clapping, and standing on the city hall steps was not a
crime. More so, the demonstrators right to peacefully assemble and protest their
complaints were protected by the United States Constitution. When arrests did start,
slowly at first and then greatly increasing in number as the movement gained momentum,
it was because white local authorities used their powers to create new laws specifically
targeted at demonstrators’ actions. Nothing about the protestor’s methods changed, yet
they began facing mass arrests as authorities intentionally created laws to criminalize
protestor’s actions. These laws took the form of an injunction issued by Judge Aiken and
a law requiring a permit to “parade” downtown passed by city council which never even
officially made it into Danville’s law books.
Danville Corporation Court Judge Archibald Aiken exercised a substantial
amount of authority in the city. He was infamous for the pistol he wore on his hip in the
courtroom as he handed the convicted defendants their sentences. Aiken later tried to
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deny that he had ever worn the pistol while serving on the bench, but Chief McCain
openly admitted to the Register he had recommended to Judge Aiken that he carry one on
him at all times because of the “tenseness of the situation.”105 Thus, Judge Aiken had the
reputation for being intimidating in the courtroom and very friendly with the chief of
police. On June 6th, after a full week of protesting without any sign of easing up, Judge
Aiken issued an injunction attempting to ban all further demonstrations, effective
immediately, and also called for the formation of a special grand jury to investigate
“racial disturbances” in the city.106 The injunction, which would be reinforced throughout
the summer and upheld as lawful in federal court later on, criminalized unlawful
assembly in the streets or public buildings of Danville, unlawful interference with the
enterprises of private businesses, and “unauthorized gatherings and loud, boisterous and
concerted demonstrations interfering with the peace and quiet enjoyment of the citizens
of the City of Danville.”107 This injunction would make it impossible for any
demonstrations to be carried out without violating Aiken’s orders, thus insuring the mass
arrests of protestors downtown. The special grand jury was also called to examine the
possibility to bring charges against those arrested in violation of State Statute 18.1-422.108
This statute, otherwise known as John Brown’s law, was adopted by the Virginia
legislature after John Brown’s raid on Harper’s Ferry in 1859. This original statute stated
that individuals could be charged with inciting the black population to acts of war against
whites. After the abolition of slavery in 1865, Virginia adapted the wording of this statute
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to keep the intent of the law, yet have the appearance it was no longer targeted towards
African Americans. The new revised version of State Statute 18.1-422 included charges
that could be brought against members of the white or black race who incited acts of
violence against one another.109 Aiken’s special grand jury shortly decided to indict the
demonstration’s leaders and participants under this John Brown Statute.110
Aiken’s injunction and grand jury indictments under a pre-civil war slave law
were only one of the legal avenues white authorities took to resist the ongoing movement
by criminalizing its participants. As the movement progressed in July, city leadership
grappled for additional ways to hinder the protest movement. Thus, on July 10th city
council amended the city’s parading ordinance already in existence to do the exact same
thing Aiken’s injunction had done: limit the demonstrations by criminalizing protestor
action and carrying out mass arrests for violation of the law. After the ordinance change,
Chief McCain was the only one who had the authority to accept or deny parade permits,
assuring that even if the demonstrators did go through the proper channels they certainly
would have been denied.111 The changes to the ordinance were never legally published,
nor published in the newspaper where the changes might be widely circulated for public
knowledge.112 Thus, it would be impossible for protestors to follow the law even if they
had been aware of their legal rights. The laws they were breaking that led to their arrests
did not even exists until they began demonstrating in the streets.
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Realizing they needed additional resources to keep up the movement, the
Reverend Campbell and the DCPA called the headquarters of the Student Nonviolent
Coordinating Committee in Atlanta on June 8th, and several SNCC members arrived in
Danville the next day.113 Campbell never wrote in his book what exactly led him to call
on SNCC, but with the presence of the SCLC, DCPA, and NAACP already in Danville it
is likely he sought them out as an additional resource with experience and money that
could bring reinforcements. It is unknown when exactly all SNCC members arrived, but
within a few days there were fifteen representatives including Avon Rollins, Bernice
Reagon, Cordell Reagon, Robert (Bob) Zellner, Dorothy Zellner, and photographer
Danny Lyon.114 By 1963, SNCC was operating two unofficial sectors in its organization:
one that was focused on voter registration and one focused on direct protest action.
Community leaders could call SNCC when they request additional resources and would
receive help from SNCC members specializing in direct action tactics. It was members of
this group that SNCC sent to aid the Danville protestors.
SNCC’s stay in Danville only lasted about ten days, yet the organization had a
significant impact on the local protest movement.115 SNCC brought tactical training,
resources, and publicity to Danville. In training sessions held at High Street Baptist
Church, just a few blocks from the municipal building downtown, SNCC field workers
taught young protestors the strategies they would need in order to make it through the
mass arrests that would follow in the coming weeks.116 Demonstrators were instructed to
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go limp when arrested, a tactic that infuriated police.117 Police captain Juby Towler later
claimed that demonstrators were also taught how to fall down, grimace, and scrape their
face on the pavement to appear as though they had been beaten by police, but there is no
evidence to indicate this was ever taught or exhibited by the Danville protestors.118 SNCC
photographer Danny Lyon snapped pictures of the movement that were dispersed
throughout SNCC’s national offices, and Dorothy Zellner wrote a pamphlet that was
published by the organization’s national office and sent to other SNCC offices across the
country highlighting the particularly bad violence in Danville.119 Zellner later stated in an
interview that, out of all the localities she traveled to during her years with SNCC,
Danville was by far the worst she ever saw and experienced when it came to outright
violence and police brutality.120
White authorities in Danville took quick action shortly after the protesting began
in order to prevent the movement from gaining further momentum. The city court system,
city administration, and police force worked together to create a wall of white resistance
they hoped would be solid enough to hold back the tides of change rolling through the
South in 1963. Similar to the desegregation of the public library in 1960, local authorities
in Danville aimed to ignore and even override national policies and federal court orders
in an attempt to maintain control over social and political life in Danville. The fight over
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civil rights in Danville came to be more than just black equality versus white supremacy,
but also local versus national. Black citizens in Danville led the civil rights battle backed
by national organizations and leaders such as Martin Luther King, Jr., the Southern
Christian Leadership Conference, and Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee.
These organizations brought with them resources in the form of organizers, speakers,
secretaries, photographers, writers, money, and more in hopes of turning the tide in favor
of civil rights achievement in Danville. Yet, despite help from such prominent national
groups and figures, white resistance in Danville still had a greater advantage over the
protestors. It seemed to be that no amount of money and national resources would be
enough to successfully fight a local system of white political power that was reinforced
by a violent police department and racist legal system.
Mayor Julian Stinson and city manager Edward Temple, both of whom held the
same respective positions during the library fight two years earlier, were quick to speak
out after the first arrests on June 5th. In a statement to the Register, Stinson commended
police chief Eugene McCain for calling in the fire trucks as a threat to the crowd, and
praised them on the restraint they were able to show “in the face of an unfortunate
situation.”121 The fire hoses were not used on demonstrators during this encounter, but
the threat they would be deployed if needed was enough to make much of the young
crowd disperse. Stinson’s praise of restraint also indicates an acknowledgement by him
that the use of firehoses on demonstrators could be extremely dangerous, yet clearly a
necessary step if the protestors did not clear the town hall steps. The fire department was
called in by Chief McCain only a few days after the protests started, and the speed at
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which the fire department was used as a dispersal tactic, coupled with its endorsement by
the mayor, was a clear indication that key power structures in Danville had no intention
of even considering listening to the civil rights marches, and were more than willing to
resort to violence in order to silence them.
Mayor Stinson also demeaned the protestors by claiming their actions would have
a negative effect on the industry which was planning to come to Danville, an industry
Stinson stated would mean jobs for both black and white citizens. Stinson’s comment
casts blame on the black community for their own economic misfortunes by insinuating it
was their own actions that keep beneficial jobs out of the city. His comments also echo a
similar concern expressed by white citizens during the library fight two years earlier. As
seen during city council meetings in 1960, there was a collective white concern that civil
rights protests would harm whites in Danville by creating an environment that no
industry would want to settle. Stinson’s comments demonstrates both a strategy and
concept of white thought in Danville that sought to blame black civil rights seekers as
those responsible for the city’s problems, specifically causing a threat to industry in this
case. The implication is also that the fault lies specifically with the protestors, as it was
the “responsible” African American citizens who did not participate in the
demonstrations.122 Additionally, in making such public comments, Mayor Stinson is
convincing the white public to perceive the movement and demonstrators as he does, as
well as to justify the action of the Danville police department and Judge Aiken. While
many other resistance tactics by Danville authorities were aimed at the protestors
themselves, Stinson was simultaneously emitting a message to the public that aims to
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keep white citizens in line regarding the civil rights movement, who is perpetuating the
chaos, and the justifications for violent and legal avenues need to be taken to restrain
them.
Mayor Stinson made it clear at the start of the protests that he had no intention of
meeting with anyone who had been arrested during a demonstration, many of whom were
the leaders of the movement, and in doing so he surely cut himself off from the people
that were most desperate to talk to him. About six weeks into the protest, the mayor and
city manager Temple met with a group of “responsible negroes” whom Stinson claimed
were leaders in search of black community progress, yet had stayed away from the
summer demonstration.123 He also made the bold claims that some of the people with
whom he would be meeting had been discussing progressive issues with him “for the last
five years” and insisted “communications with the Negro citizens of Danville have never
been cut off at the hands of the mayor or city manager.”124
Both of Mayor Stinson’s statements seem significantly far from the truth when
considering the events of the 1963 summer and the library battle of 1960. During the
months-long legal fight over the desegregation of the public library two years prior, it
does not appear that Stinson ever made any public comments indicating he was meeting
with “responsible” black citizens who desired racial progress in the city.125 If this were
true, it is very likely it would have been printed in the newspaper. Additionally, it appears
that communication was in fact cut off by the city mayor both in 1960 and 1963. The
1963 demonstrators were eager to talk to both Mayor Stinson and Temple, which is why
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the marches were carried out at the municipal building in the first place.126 This is also
the reason demonstrators entered the building and headed to the floor where Manager
Temple’s office was located, yet Temple did not meet or speak with any demonstrators
there during the first days of protests. Stinson and Temple’s actions reflect the truth of the
situation, which was that white city leadership that had no intention of meeting or
listening to the demands of protestors, but rather put out messages to the public that
continued to demean demonstrators and portray them as irresponsible trouble-makers.

One of the most powerful mechanisms for resisting the local civil rights
movement and maintaining an order of white supremacy in Danville was the Danville
Police Force. Eugene McCain served as police chief in 1963, a job title undoubtedly
earned through this twenty-three years of service to the DPD.127 There is little known
about Chief McCain’s personal life, but through his actions it is evident he firmly
supported the agenda of white city leadership. His leadership techniques and utilization
of his officers during the Danville protests mirrored that of police action in Birmingham,
likely explaining why SNCC activist Robert Zellner later referred to McCain as a “Bull
Connor type.”128 It was McCain’s decision on the violent night of June 10th to call in the
Danville fire department, urged on by Mayor Stinson who told McCain to “give ‘em all
you’ve got.”129 That particular day there were thirty-eight demonstrators arrested during
the day’s events, and that night a group of sixty-five demonstrators marched to the jail to
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pray and sing. The group was led by another local church leader, Reverend H. McGhee,
and Gloria Campbell the wife of leader Reverend Lawrence Campbell who had also been
arrested that day.130 Recollections from demonstrators state that they marched from Bible
Way church to the city jail, and planned to surround it and pray for those arrested.131
Demonstrators claim that police attacked as they were kneeling to pray, but McCain
states in his court testimony during the trials that fall that the group was rowdy and
attempting to storm the jail.132
McCain had already called the fire trucks in several days prior to threaten the
protestors, yet this time when the crowd remained undaunted by their appearance the
police chief ordered the hoses to be released directly on the demonstrators. In the
aftermath, protestors would describe how when they fled from the hoses, McCain had
them cornered next to the jail with another truck.133 McCain essentially admitted to this
in his court testimony months later, acknowledging that because the hoses would not
reach the protestors he ordered another truck pull in behind them and release the hoses.134
Protestors recall how people were knocked to the ground and sent sliding down the street
“the way rain washes away trash during a storm.”135 Once sprayed to the ground, the
police descended on the wet and injured protestors, beating and arresting many. Though
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records only exists for thirteen individuals, there are reports that say more than forty
needed medical attention at the all-black Winslow Hospital.136
Dorothy Zellner, SNCC activist who was attacked by police on the night of
Bloody Monday, wrote of the demonstrators in her pamphlet, “Danville, Virginia.”
Zellner wrote with great detail of the attacks on demonstrators the night of Bloody
Monday, when Chief McCain used the fire department to wash protestors away from the
jail, and the police used batons and dogs to attack peaceful demonstrators clamoring for
safety. Zellner describes how about sixty-five demonstrators, including several of the
SNCC activists, marched to surround the jail and sing hymns in support of those arrested
earlier in the day. Reverend Campbell and several of the other had been arrested, so the
group was led by Campbell’s wife, Gloria, and Reverend McGhee. As the group
approached the police tried to stop them, smashing Robert Zellner’s camera and
demanding Reverend McGhee disperse the crowd. Instead, when the reverend began to
pray Chief McCain gave the orders to the waiting fire trucks to “Let ‘em have it.”137
Gloria Campbell’s testimony reinforces this account, claiming that Chief McCain
personally beat her with a baton while demonstrators were attacked by dogs and “hosed
down to the ground and washed away like trash”.138
The level of violence inflicted onto protestors by police in Danville seemed to be
an innate reaction to the chaos and unpreparedness of the police department in response
to an unexpected civil rights movement. Whether Danville police believed themselves to
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be ill-equipped in numbers, or seeking to create a more intimidating presence, they also
brought in assistance from the state police and deputized white garbage collectors and
bus drivers from the street.139 Resorting to violence so soon into the protest movement
indicates a heightened fear at the potential loss of white power in the city. The black
citizenry had been making slow steps towards equality since the desegregation of the
public library, but the direct protests were different. They were a visible threat in a way
that the legal battles behind closed doors had never been. Lawsuits were one thing, but
ongoing protests by hundreds right in front of the city government offices were another.
One year after the Danville protests police captain Juby Towler published a book
titled The Police Roll in Racial Conflicts intended to guide to other police officers and
departments in the South on how to properly handle racial demonstrations as the civil
rights movement intensified. Towler states at the beginning of he book will focus on the
morality of the policeman’s “obligations, responsibility, duty, and his respect for his role
in maintaining law and order.”140 Though the book never blatantly says it is about the
events in Danville, Towler only served as an officer of the DPD throughout his career,
thus his only experience in dealing with “racial conflict” must have come from the
Danville protests. Additionally, all of the pictures and events referenced in the book very
clearly depict the events that took place in downtown Danville during the summer of
1963. It is uncertain how many copies were printed of Towler’s book or how widespread
its usage was, but after the book’s first printing in 1964 there was a second printing done
by the original publishers five years later in 1969. The book also received high reviews
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from Police-Law Digest and The Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology, and Police
Science.141 In an analysis of Towler’s book, a clearer picture of Danville police
motivations and actions to uphold white supremacy during the protest movement
becomes evident. Through Towler’s writing a visual of the Danville police response to
and perception of the movement emerges.
Towler sets the tone for his book in the first chapter, “Background or Basic
Understanding” by detailing what police departments utilizing this guide should
understand about black citizens and civil rights protestors at their most basic level: that
black persons are impressionable to outside agitators, protestors fake injuries in order to
portray unrealistic violence to the media, and that demonstrators do not believe the law
applies to them simply because they believe the law is unfair.142 He writes that police
must consider that “the negro race may or may not have an inherent weakness for being
easily incited to action” by those from national organizations that claim to bring peace
but only incite chaos and lawlessness.143 Towler’s choice to focus on the chaos brought
by outside organizations likely mirrors the DPD response to the presence of SNCC, the
SCLC, and other national figures in Danville during the civil rights marches. SNCC’s
tactic of hosting workshops, those of which were held at High Street Baptist Church in
Danville, was common knowledge to both protestors and police.144 Towler wrote that
these workshops cast a hypnotical spell over the demonstrators, which cause the muscles
of those who march to “twitch spasmodically, and their minds seem to be removed from
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immediate comprehension.”145 If it is true that demonstrators who were arrested twitched
or appeared to be in a daze, the answer for such behavior may lie in the fear they felt at
being arrested by a violent police force rather than a “self-induced hypnotism.”146
Towler’s assessment ultimately portrays civil rights demonstrators as having weak and
impressionable minds which are easily subject to manipulation tactics.
This is similar to the tone the Register undertook during the demonstrations as
they portrayed the movement as being fueled by outside agitators who had nothing to do
with Danville.147 It also reinforces the comments made by Mayor Stinson about meeting
with “responsible” black citizens to discuss racial progress in Danville, indicating that the
black leaders and participants of the movement in Danville were irresponsible.148 These
comments and suppositions made by leadership in the city demonstrate that these white
institutions of power were working together, whether intentionally or not, to actively put
out the message to the public that African Americans who participated in civil rights
demonstrations were inferior, weak-minded, and had no real self-motivation to participate
in the movement themselves. Rather, they had been stirred up by national forces outside
of Danville and thus did not reflect the real wishes of the black community in the city.
Though the Register’s publishing of the mayor’s comments likely only reached
Danville’s citizens, it is almost a certainty that Towler’s book reached many more.
Towler’s target audience were those that were responsible for directing the physical force
behind resisting the civil rights movement: southern policemen. The extent of the
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potential damage that Towler’s guide to the proper police role in “racial conflicts” is
impossible to know, but it is not unreasonable to suppose the same attitudes taken on by
the Danville police force, later to be published in Towler’s book, influenced many other
police forces throughout the South during the civil rights movement.
Towler also minimizes the extent of police violence by claiming protestors
intentionally scraped their face on the ground and practiced wincing in front of cameras,
as well as staging scenes during the protest to make it appear as though the police were
being violent or acting improperly, even though they were not (according to Towler).149
For example, on page 29 of Towler’s book there is a picture of a black protestor who
looks to have fallen on the ground and two police officer leaning over him. One officer
has a night stick in his hand, and the other holds his left foot up as if he was caught midkick by the camera. Towler uses this instance to instruct other policemen not to issue
nightsticks to officers who are untrained in being able to identify situations such as this,
where the protestor will put on a fake grimace in front of the camera. This picture “worth
1000 words, may then go public and make the officer look like the one committing the
wrong in the situation when, in reality, it was clearly the law-breaking protestor.150
In an interesting twist, Towler does not reference the use of firehoses as a tactic in
any sort of way, though it was clearly used by the Danville police department multiple
times.151 It may be that Towler did not agree with Chief McCain’s use of the firehoses, as
he considered those to be too violent of a method, or at least one that brought the police
department bad press.
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On the opposite side of Towler’s book which portrays civil rights demonstrators as
mindless degenerates, his writings also lend insight into the disorganization and
miscommunication experienced by the DPD in their handling of the demonstrations. A
few of his summarizing points in the final chapter include “Don’t issue guns and night
sticks to untrained men”, “Don’t let prisoners be manhandled”, “Do give thought to
eliminating confusion”, and “Do give thought to simple selective assignment of police
personnel to insure calmest performers in most hectic duties.”152 There are very few
sources available from the civil rights movement in Danville that come from the police
perspective. In the last sixty years, evidence has been destroyed, notes thrown away, and
arrest reports long discarded.153 Thus, Towler’s book serves as an invaluable piece of
evidence in lending insight to the police approach during the movement. In its totality,
the book represents the thought behind the all-white Danville Police Force which fought
violently to put down the protests and maintain an order of white supremacy in Danville.

The end of June brought the end of the first month of the direct protest phase of
the civil rights movement in Danville. White resistance adapted quickly, utilizing their
political power and influence to sway the white citizenry, change laws, and transform
police techniques in order to put an end to the movement as quickly as they could. Their
combined efforts and willingness to utilize violence led to mass arrests, which left
protestors fearful and the movement with fewer and fewer resources after each
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demonstration. Even with the support from national civil rights groups like the SCLC and
SNCC, the movement was slowly draining away. July would bring a new phase to the
movement. As demonstrations began to die down, black city leadership would adapt as
best they could while their resources dwindled, massive arrests perpetuated, and their
relationships with outside organizations deteriorated. White resistance tactics would also
continue adapting, but unlike the demonstration movement, their institutional power
permitted them to remain steady and intense in their fight against civil rights. The protest
movement was nearly over, but the ongoing battle would soon move from the streets
back to the courtroom.

75

August, 1963
The most notable event in the national civil rights movement took place on
August 28th, 1963. The March for Jobs and Freedom in Washington D.C. drew national
attention as more than 200,000 demonstrators flooded the national mall. It was a
scorching hot day, yet protestors still marches in the same fashion as many of the
marches in the years prior had been carried out, with plenty of signs, singing, and
clapping. The intent behind the march was to pressure legislators in Washington to push
for more comprehensive civil rights for black Americans.154 Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.
delivered his famous “I Have a Dream Speech” about his hopes for the future of black
Americans and their children. King used his speech to speak against the horrors of racism
in 1963 America, including segregation, economic injustice, and police brutality.155 This
landmark event marked a turning point in civil rights history as it pushed lawmakers in
Washington to craft widespread civil rights legislation which eventually led to the
passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.156
Many of King’s sentiments from his speech reflect the injustices faced by African
Americans all throughout the South, including those living in Danville, Virginia. Though
King’s speech at Washington was not the same as the one he delivered at High Street
Baptist Church in Danville the previous month, his statements that civil rights activists
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“will not be satisfied until justice rolls down like waters and righteousness like a mighty
stream” closely mirrored his famous line from his Danville speech that “justice would
flow over Danville like water from a mighty stream.”157 King’s heavy emphasis on the
need for economic justice nationally for black Americans is an echo of the demands of
the DCPA in Danville for job equality and the rationale behind their city-wide boycott of
businesses that refused to hire black workers. His references to intense police brutality
also closely mirrored the situation in Danville, where protestors had been faced by a
militant police department all summer. The 200,000 marchers listening to King speak
knew all too well the struggles highlighted in his speech. To them, and to the protestors in
Danville fighting for their rights, the horrors of social, political, and economic injustice
were a lived experience every day.
Danville resident and civil rights activist Carolyn Wilson recalled traveling to the
March on Washington to participate in the historic event with other demonstrators from
Danville. Fifty-two years had passed, and some of her memories were foggy. She
couldn’t remember how many people went, just that they were all so excited on the bus
trip up north. They left Danville from High Street Baptist Church incredibly early in the
morning to begin the journey, and stayed with a kind Jewish family in Maryland the night
before the march. The morning of the march they drove into Washington D.C. to meet the
crowds of hundreds of thousands just like them. This time, thankfully, they were able to
march surrounded by like-minded people without being attacked by police or thrown in
jail. Only fourteen years old in 1963, Carolyn recalled that she never thought about her
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participation in the movement that summer as something historic, or as a national
movement that would be written about in history books years later. “We were just doing
what we thought was right,” she said. When asked what it was like to attend the March
on Washington with her fellow justice-seeking friends, her eyes became teary and her
hands clasped together over her chest. “It was magnificent.”158
August of 1963 marked a turning point in the national civil rights narrative, and a
turning point in the Danville movement as well. The direct-protest action phase of the
movement would come to a close as the fight moved from the streets and into the
courtroom. White authorities would continue working together in Danville to ensure the
movement was defeated legally just as it had been defeated physically in the city. There
were some immediate, tangible gains that would result from the demonstrator’s efforts.
The integration of George Washington High School took place that month when five
black students, all children of local demonstrators, attended classes at the formerly allwhite high school.159 In the following months, the city would hire its first black police
officer in seventy years and businesses would finally begin caving to the boycott and
hiring black clerks in department stores.160 These small steps were notable, especially
when faced with such strong white resistance in the city. However, white authorities in
the street and courtrooms were the ones who held the real institutional power. Working
together to form a barrier of extreme white resistance to the Danville civil rights
movement, Judge Aiken, prosecutor Ferguson, and councilman-turned-prosecutor John
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Carter dominated local legal battles against demonstrators and the NAACP in the years
following the Danville movement. In the decade following the end of the Danville
movement, a tumultuous ride of wins and losses on each side would continue to rage on.
Ultimately, the goals of the movement were unable to be realized in the face of an
insurmountable barrier of white power that controlled social, political, and legal life in
Danville, Virginia.
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Danville, 1963
July
“But it was difficult to mobilize masses under conditions of intense and sustained
repression…The administration of justice in Danville was by now such a farce that this
sort of nonsense had become standard practice.”
-Robert Zellner, activist of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee on Danville

As the hot summer progressed into July, the Danville movement dwindled
significantly until coming to a complete halt in August of 1963. The DCPA fought
tirelessly to keep the movement alive, but it seemed that weeks of violence and turmoil
had drained the resources and willpower of Danville’s civil rights protesters. The
Register’s mischaracterized and belittling reports of the events had ensured no city-based
white support would offer themselves to aid the movement. Though a few white
resources from outside Danville came to offer their help, it was no use. The Danville
Police Department had arrested hundreds of black citizens, many of whom were facing
large fines and would be required to take days off from work to attend court hearings.
The NAACP and DCPA tried to pay as many legal fees as they could, but the financial
burden of so many arrested and court hearings obliterated the organizations’ funds for the
Danville movement. One by one, SNCC activists fled south away from Danville to
escape a definite prison sentence that was waiting for them if they stayed to see their day
in court. African Americans were terrified for their safety, and began showing up to
demonstrate less and less. There would still be a few small wins granted to black citizens
in the fallout of the movement, but they seemed insignificant in the face of months’ worth
of hard work and organizing. By the time the nation watched Martin Luther King Jr.
deliver his famous speech at the March on Washington in late August, the Danville civil
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rights movement had come to a close. Though the movement had brought about a few
pieces of tangible change to the city, white resistance fueled by institutional privilege,
control, and leadership in Danville would emerge the victor at the end of the summer.
Following the end of the direct action, a significant transition in the Danville civil
rights movement occurred. Though the protest movement had wound down after an
intense two months, there was still a legal fight to be carried out in the courtroom.
Hundreds of demonstrators had been arrested and would have to show their faces in
court, and both NAACP defense lawyers and city prosecutors geared up for what
everyone anticipated would be months of drawn-out court battles. Rather than months,
the legal fallout from the Danville movement perpetuated for an entire decade as court
trials were held, decisions made then appealed, and state and federal courts became
involved. The trial transcripts provide further insights into the powerful force of white
institutions of justice in Danville, highlighting the nearly insurmountable obstacles faced
by demonstrators when they saw their day in court. Charged in violation of laws that had
been crafted specifically to target the Danville civil rights participants, defendants found
themselves in a courtroom fighting against the very individuals responsible for creating
those laws, primary Judge Aiken city councilman-turned-prosecutor John Carter. Judge
Aiken, along with prosecutors Carter and James Ferguson had the power to ensure no
black protestor in Danville would see a fair trial.

The once organized and fiery movement slowly began to unravel as July passed.
In an effort to drum up support once more, Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. returned to
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Danville to deliver a speech at a very full High Street Baptist church on July 11th .161
Earlier in the day a small demonstration had taken place downtown once again at the
steps of city hall, which at this point had been barricaded. SNCC field secretary Bob
Zellner wrote that two other SNCC workers, Sam Shirah and Daniel Foss, were
observing the protest when they were sized by Virginia State Trooper and four detectives.
Zellner also wrote that Shirah was taken to the police station and severely beaten,
emerging later with an injured right leg and ripped clothes.162 In response to Shirah’s
beating, masses of students marched downtown in protest approximately sixty of them
are arrested.163 After a full day of events, the crowd at High Street Baptist Church was
sweaty, exhausted, and motivated. King’s address, in which he boldly declared “justice
will flow over Danville like a stream from mighty water,” was met by an eruption of
applause from the audience.164
Stirred to action once more from the day’s events and King’s words, members of
the crowd begged King to march downtown with them, but he ultimately refused their
pleas with the excuse he was experiencing stomach trouble. King then headed to the
airport to exit the city as soon as he could, leaving Danville with only his words for the
second time in six months.165 Unwilling to be deterred by his refusal, over one hundred
people left the church to make the short march to city hall. Chief McCain met them at the
city hall steps, confronting the group with a militant police force and racial slurs. “Why
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don’t you n***** get on back where you came from?” McCain reportedly asked as the
crowd began to disburse.166 There wasn’t any violence that evening, but another thirteen
arrests carried out, which brought the day’s total to around seventy-five arrests. Fueled
with the excitement and resolve from the day prior, the following day several more
demonstrations took place, and between twenty-five and thirty persons were arrested. The
total number of jailed protestors had risen to over one hundred in just forty-eight hours.167
The July 12th headline of the Register announced “Police Halt March After King
Talks and Negroes Walk,” including pictures of Martin Luther King Jr. with Danville
leader Reverend Chase, a woman holding a protest sign, and a picture from inside the
High Street Baptist Church. The picture from inside the church only shows one side of
the large auditorium, with the caption “Small audience hears King in first speech of day,”
even though the room is clearly holding a significant number of people. The rest of the
article focuses on the demonstrations of the previous day, and brings the perspective of
white power and authority to the story of the day’s events. In describing the large
amounts of arrests that were carried out during the day, most of whom were students and
young adults, the article states the police were “accommodating the Negroes in their
wishes to “fill the jails”.” This rhetoric is almost an exact replica of the stories published
by the Register during the Birmingham, Alabama march a month prior. In Birmingham,
the police had “obliged” the protestors when they chanted “fill the jails.” Now, in
Danville, the police "obliged” their own demonstrators who chanted the same things.168
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Reporting such as this kept the fault of disruption and violence in Danville with the black
demonstrators, and ensured that the paper’s wide white readership knew who to blame for
the chaos downtown. Another white city paper, The Bee, characterized King’s speech and
subsequent demonstrating as “a hit-and-run commando raid”.169
The Bee article also includes similar sentiments, but goes a step further by
explaining a multitude of perceived white generosities to the black community. To the
white reader, not only were the black demonstrators bringing harm to themselves by
asking the police to essentially react with force and massive arrests, but their actions
seemed especially heinous in light of the overwhelming white generosity offered to the
black community in the years leading up to the demonstrations. An unnamed author
wrote,
“ Not many other Southern communities can boast of what we have done of
recent years for the Negro community. We have given it a million dollar high school, a
city operated hospital, a generous welfare and social services policy, two all-Negro
developments providing attractive homes, and destruction of the unsightly subnormal
dwellings. We have given and continue to make a contribution to seasonal unemployment
by giving equal pay to Negroes employed in like capacity. And yet, in spite of these
progressions an element of our Negro population allows itself to be led by the halter into
the vicissitudes which today beset us.”170
The implication of this comment is that white leadership in Danville had given the black
community everything it needed and more prior to the protest movement. The had their
own schools, a hospital, and, supposedly, better housing. However, nothing in this list the
author has curated has anything to do with the real demands of the demonstrators which
they had proclaimed since the start of the movement. Leaders of the Danville civil rights
movement wanted equal employment opportunities and an end to segregation, but their
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demands had fallen on deaf ears since the start of the movement. The Danville
newspapers carried no real weight in political or legal decisions over the course of the
summer, but they did hold a strong social significance. In catering to white segregationist
sympathies throughout the course of the summer, Danville papers, especially the
Register, had served to reinforce the ideologies of Danville authorities and ensure a
negative public portrayal of the national and local civil rights movement.
Further newspaper reports after King’s visit to Danville lend insight into how
misguided the public white perspective was when it came to the protest movement in the
city. After King’s visit to Danville and speech at High Street Baptist Church, the Register
and The Bee placed King at the fault behind the rush of protesting after his speeches, and
immediately elevated him to a place of significance within the Danville civil rights
movement. The Register headlines included “Police Halt March After King Talks And
Negroes Walk” and “King’s Many Boasts – All Empty!” along with the earlier
referenced piece from The Bee, “Fanning the Flames” which blamed King for the
continued uproar in Danville.171 In treating King, the SCLC, SNCC, and other whites
from outside Danville who came to offer their support as outside agitators who did not
represent the views of the city, the paper created the public perception that Danville was a
city under attack from a liberal agenda, rather than the grass-roots organization it truly
was. The incorporation of these national figures and organizations was intended to revive
the movement after weeks of exhaustive marching and protesting, yet it is likely this
inclusion actually hastened the movement’s demise. The perpetuated narrative by the
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city’s primary white-controlled newspaper reinforced the negative public perception of
protestors and created even more barriers for the movement to face.
After King’s departure and deeper fissures forming in the movement, one last,
massive protest event was planned for downtown. It would be called D-Day, short for
“demonstration day,” and Reverend Campbell declared that over 1,000 individuals would
show up to pledge their support.172According to SNCC secretary Robert Zellner, D-Day
was initially scheduled for July 21st, but Reverend Campbell, who had been gathering
signatures of support, decided to push back the event by one week. Though Zellner
doesn’t explicitly write the reasoning behind this decision, it is likely Campbell was
trying to buy time in order to gain more tangible support. When D-Day finally did arrive,
it was a complete disaster. The newspapers had reported that the alleged 1,000 people
were to show up, but only seventy-seven did, all of whom were arrested and thrown into
jail. Robert Zellner writes that the demonstrators in Danville were tired and afraid, and
rightfully so. After experiencing weeks of high-stress marches, police violence, and
massive arrests accompanied by high bail costs, individuals were worn down. The
community was bankrupt, as all their funds had been dumped into lawyer fees and bail
pricing that were accumulating higher and higher with each demonstration. Furthermore,
the relationship between SNCC and the DCPA began to break down as disagreements
over tactics and how to push forward arose in the final efforts to sustain the movement.
By the end of the month, nearly all of the SNCC workers in Danville had fled the state to
avoid further beatings, arrests, and court battles that would undoubtedly land them in
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jail.173 The pressure of a white supremacist institution was too great for civil rights
protestors to overcome, even with national aid and resources sent to aid them. As Zellner
concludes, “it was difficult to mobilize the masses under conditions of intense and
sustained repression…”174 Under such intense and sustained white pressure, as Zellner
phrases it, the movement could no longer continue as it had since its conception at the
end of May. The Danville civil rights movement had burned hot and bright for several
weeks, but ultimately with no political power or allies in Danville’s white institutions, the
movement was extinguished. .

Moving into August, there were no longer any mass demonstrations or organizing
hundreds of protestors to descend on city hall. The pubic organizing and demonstrations
of the Danville civil rights movement was over, even as leaders scrambled to find ways to
keep the fight alive. When school started that month, seven black students were selected
to attend the formerly all-white George Washington High School. This was the first
integration of any public schools in the city, and the students chosen to integrate were all
children of the movement’s leaders.175 The DCPA had been encouraging a boycott all
summer of businesses that refused to employ African Americans, and sometime that fall
the first black clerk at a local department store was hired. More soon followed, as the
boycott was successful in affecting white-owned businesses.176 There were even local
Jewish business owners who had given money to the movement over the summer in an
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effort to relieve the economic pressure brought on by the DCPA boycott.177 In October,
the first black policeman in over ninety years was hired at the Danville Police
Department, though Chief McCain made sure to state it was only because there were not
enough suitable candidates to choose from. There was a brief glimmer of hope the direct
protest movement would revive itself that November when Martin Luther King Jr. swore
he would return to Danville and lead another demonstration in the city, but, as Robert
Zellner writes, “the Messiah never showed up.”
The black community had secured a few tangible victories since the start of the
movement in the late spring, and the phase of the movement consisting of direct protest
action and demands for economic and social equality were over. Though the outcome
was not nearly what civil rights leadership had desired, the victories there were able to
accomplish in the face of such intense repression was certainly notable. However, white
city leadership was far from satisfied with the outcome of the movement. Enraged that
such an affront to social order had been brought to the city, Judge Aiken, Danville police
officers, and Councilman John Carter were set to get their revenge through months of
ongoing court proceedings that would continue to place a significant economic toll on
demonstrators and their families. In addition to court costs and bail money, city attorneys
sought to humiliate and downgrade the civil rights participants and thugs, criminals, and
liars. The local branch of the NAACP utilized its best lawyers, Ruth Harvey Wood and
Jerry Williams, to defend demonstrators and cross-examine police, but it was of little use.
The court trials following the end of the movement reinforced that oppressive systems of
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white power in Danville had barely faltered during the course of the movement, and they
ensured to make a mockery of the black citizens who had fought for their civil rights.
The trials of demonstrators began in July, kicking off what would become years
of bitter court battles. By the start of the trials over 250 demonstrators had been arrested
and were charged with “contempt, trespassing, disorderly conduct, assault, parading
without a permit, and resisting arrest.”178 There were also many parents charged with
contributing to the delinquency of a minor for allowing their children to participate in the
demonstrations. Local lawyers Ruth L. Harvey and Jerry Williams, both affiliated with
the NAACP, along with NAACP lawyer Len Holt from Norfolk, took the job of
defending demonstrators.179 It was Jerry Williams’ sons, Robert and Jerry Jr., who had
participated in the sit-in at the public library two years prior to start the direct protest
movement in the city. Now, their father would be responsible for continuing the civil
rights fight from the legal side by defending those arrested during the summer’s many
protests. The defense group attempted to get the demonstrators’ cases moved from
corporation to federal courts, but each of the defendants were insistent they wanted their
own day in court. Scheduling so many trials overran the court docket schedules for the
coming months, and all cases not related to civil rights arrests were pushed back to a
significantly later date.180
The city prosecutors representing Danville were none other than attorney James
Ferguson and councilman John Carter, two of the most prevalent and powerful
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individuals who had led the segregationist cause during the fight for the library three
years earlier. Ferguson had been exasperated at the state court’s ruling that allowed black
citizens to use the formerly all-white public library at the Sutherlin Mansion. If Ferguson
thought the idea of black citizens being in the Confederate library was “blasphemous,” it
is likely he found protestor’s demands for equal rights, access to private and public
facilities, and fair economic opportunity equally repulsive.181 His 1960 loss in federal
court no doubt left him with a bitter attitude towards black civil rights activists, and the
prosecution of demonstrators in 1963 presented an opportunity to redeem himself. Like
Ferguson, councilman John Carter had also suffered a humiliating loss in the aftermath of
the federal decision to open Danville’s public libraries to all citizens regardless of race.
Not only was Carter leading the fight to close the public libraries completely from his
position as a city councilmember, but he was also a leading figure in the planning of a
private library for white citizens. Once city council voted to allow all citizens use the
library, and their decision was supported by federal courts shortly after, John Carter’s
work for a private library quickly fell apart. In 1963 he was still serving on city council,
yet simultaneously took on the role of prosecutor in handling the massive case load that
came at the end of the movement. In 1960, Carter had been adamant he would never give
in to the NAACP, and yet he would face them directly in court as both sides fought an
extension of the battle that had been brewing for the past three years. The pending court
battles would be a struggle over who held the power in Danville, and it was going to get
ugly.
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The first of the trials to take place was The City of Danville, Virginia v. Lawrence
G. Campbell, et als at the beginning of August in 1963. On trial were Lawrence
Campbell and other leaders and participants of the movement who had been arrested for
violating Judge Aiken’s injunction and the John Brown Statute. Arguing for the
prosecution were James Ferguson and John Carter, with NAACP lawyers Ruth Harvey
Wood, Jerry Williams, Irwin Miller, and Harry Wood representing the defendants. The
long lineup of witnesses included key members of the movement and its opposition such
as Chief Eugene McCain, Juby Towler, T. Edward Temple, Reverend Chase, and Doyle
Thomas.182 Judge Aiken was the presiding judge, and the transcripts reveal that most of
the objections made by the NAACP defense council were shut down or brushed off over
the course of the hearing. Each side had their own story; the defense claimed wrongdoing
by the city police during the demonstrations, and the prosecution argued they were
particularly gracious throughout the demonstrations. Altogether, the transcripts from that
first trial provides thorough insights into the reinforcing facets of white resistance in
Danville that existed between city leadership, legal system, and police department
working together to halt the civil rights movement.
Chief McCain’s questioning by prosecutor Ferguson focused predominately on
the tactics of the demonstrators since the movement began and followed a chronological
approach, seemingly trying to construct his argument by demonstrating a pattern of
widespread disruption to businesses and the downtown areas during the summer.
McCain’s responses centered around justifying the police department’s actions and mass
arrests because demonstrators would not listen to police order to disperse from the
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sidewalks and roadways. McCain’s account lacks a description of any police violence
whatsoever, even on the violent and chaotic night of Bloody Monday. McCain’s
description of the night was brief when asked by Ferguson what transpired, and stated
that he only the demonstrators had marched to the jail and refused to disperse. “They
wouldn’t leave, again being told to do so. And I told the fire department to turn the water
on them, which they did.”183 Gloria Campbell and SNCC activist Dorothy Zellner both
testified later on the group had been praying when the fire hoses were turned on them,
something that McCain does not address.184 Afterwords, Ferguson asked McCain if the
water hoses dispersed the crowd and McCain responded that the crowd had not broken
up, so he sent his officers in “to pull them aloose from the cars and from each other.”185
In spite of this claim, the multiple witness accounts, hospital records, and photographs of
banged headwounds of demonstrators, indicate that McCain’s men did significantly more
than just “pull them aloose”. They severely beat protestors as well.186
Irwin Miller’s cross examination was quite different from Ferguson’s initial
questioning of McCain. Miller attempted to ask McCain more pointed questions about his
and the police department’s actions in enforcing Judge Aiken’s injunction, but was asked
interrupted by attorney Ferguson and dismissed by Judge Aiken. When Miller asks
McCain if he was aware of the numerous individuals who needed treatment at Winslow
hospital after the night of Bloody Monday, Ferguson interrupts and tries to answer the
question himself. Ferguson openly admitted there were some African Americans who
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went to the hospital for first aid that night, but there was no proof they had taken part in
the demonstration, and “that’s as far as the Chief can testify.”187 Chief McCain goes on to
state essentially the same thing Ferguson had just said, and that he didn’t know the extent
of any injuries that may have occurred.188 Later, Miller attempts to ask McCain if he
could prove that there were citizens in Danville complaining of the demonstrations
downtown by producing the letters of complaint McCain claimed existed. Ferguson
objects over the relevancy of such complaints, and Aiken agrees and dismisses the line of
questioning as immaterial.189 As Miller tries to hand off examination to co-counsel Ruth
Harvey Wood, Aiken refuses to allow it, claiming that in the interest of brevity only one
member of counsel is permitted to examine each witness.190 The exact time that Ferguson
was permitted by the court to question McCain is unknown, but the trial transcript shows
that Ferguson’s questioning took up over 100 pages, while Miller’s cross examination
was significantly shorter in both page length and actually questioning considering the
multiple interruptions.191
The rest of the witness testimony followed a similar pattern, with Judge Aiken
showing considerable leniency with Carter and Ferguson, yet eager to shut down and
begrudge the work of the NAACP defense lawyers. Ferguson and Carter worked
diligently to go through each day of the protest movement in an effort to portray the
movement as orchestrated by dangerous outsiders who had flocked to Danville to cause
trouble during the summer. At one point during the questioning of Danville police officer
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Neal Morris, John Carter went through the list of multiple SNCC workers who had come
to Danville, asked Morris if he knew them, and had Morris state over and over they were
not natives of the city.192 There were also heated questions between the prosecution and
defense over whether or not there had been any violence committed by the protestors
towards police. Officer W.L Osborne claimed his patrol car had been shot at the night of
Bloody Monday’s events as he drove past Winslow Hospital where the beaten
demonstrators were being treated.193 Ruth Wood brought an intense cross-examination in
an effort to illustrate that even if the incidents Osborne was testifying to had occurred,
there was no proof that the act had been committed by a civil rights protestor. Thus,
Wood motioned for Osborne’s testimony to be struck from the record as it could not be
tied in with the demonstrations. Judge Aiken denied her request.194 At the end of the trial,
all four defendants were convicted.195
This first trial is important not only for understanding the perspective of police
and those in power who sought to hinder the movement, but also for recognizing the
institutional factors that enabled white authorities in Danville to utilize such power while
simultaneously blocking African Americans from exercising the same rights. In the
courtroom, Judge Aiken was the voice of authority. This trial specifically was for the
purpose of deciding whether or not to convict Lawrence Campbell, A. I. Dunlap, Julius
Adams, and Arthur Pinchback on the charges of violating Aiken’s own injunction and the
John Brown Statute, which Aiken had convened the grand jury for earlier that summer.
Judge Aiken had issued the injunction specifically to criminalize any further
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demonstrations in Danville, so of course he considered the leaders of the continued
movement to be in violation of his own injunction. Furthermore, the legal representation
by Ferguson and Carter were leaders in the city committed to upholding white order and
staunch supporters of Aiken’s injunction. Ferguson had argued for the continued
exclusion of black patrons three years earlier during the library fight, and Carter was a
sitting council member when they passed the new addition to the parade ordinance
specifically targeted at making the downtown demonstrations illegal. Working together,
these men representing the functions of law and order in the city created web of white
power that was nearly impenetrable. They could create laws to benefit themselves with
the power to also enforce those laws in the streets and in the courtroom. Considering such
an insurmountable system, a victory by the NAACP in the courtroom would have been
nearly impossible.
In September of 1963, a class action lawsuit was filed in the Federal District
Court for the Western District of Virginia on behalf of Delores J. Page, et als against
Eugene McCain and the members of city council stating the city’s parade permit was
unconstitutional.196 That decision was still pending in January when at least seventy-two
individuals were tried and convicted for violating the Danville City Code Section 16-20.
This law was the one which prevented parading without a permit and was changed on
July 10th to make sure it would include the civil rights protestors, and all the appellants
for this case had been arrested during the failed “Demonstration Day” attempt on July
28th. In March, NAACP lawyers Ruth Harvey Wood and Jerry Williams, with the
assistance of Jack Greenberg of New York, represented the defendants as they filed their
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appeals claims with the Supreme Court of Appeals in Virginia. The lawyers argued that
this section was illegal as it violated the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, as well as the free speech and rights to assembly and petition found in the
First and Fourteenth Amendments.197 Furthermore, the updated version of the ordinance
which was passed July 10th was never made public knowledge or published legally so
that any citizen might be made aware of the updated changes or have access to it.198 In
supporting their three key arguments as to why the defendants should have their
convictions overturned, the NAACP cited twenty-eight state and federal court cases.199
James Ferguson refused to be bested by the NAACP, and filed a brief in opposition of the
NAACP’s file for an appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeals in Virginia. However, the
justices of the Supreme Court of Appeals sided with the NAACP, handing one of a few
court wins to civil rights in Danville.200
The civil rights cases from Danville, Virginia, continued to appear in state and
federal courts for a decade after the movement had actually come to a close. In 1964, the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals had struck down Judge Aiken’s injunction order by a
slim margin, 3-2, and a strong dissent supporting the constitutionality of the order based
off John Brown’s law. Three years later during the appeals process, the state courts
overturned this ruling in Thomas v. The City of Danville and declared Judge Aiken’s
injunction constitutional, allowing the court trial to proceed through the late 1960s and
early 1970s. This ruling was upheld once again in York v. City of Danville. The former
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rulings were challenged in Rollins v. Commonwealth in 1970, and a victory was given to
demonstrators when the court ruled that there had to be proof that any demonstrator not
explicitly listed in the injunction, that is anyone other than Lawrence Campbell,
Alexander Dunlap, Arthur Pinchback, and Julius Adams, had to have had prior
knowledge of Aiken’s injunction before violating it. As a result of the court’s decision in
Rollins v. Commonwealth, the courts overturned the convictions of nearly 270 individuals
arrested during the 1963 protests. However, those listed specifically in Aiken’s
injunctions did not have their convictions overturned, but upheld for their violation of the
law which the courts had deemed constitutional several years prior. The final court
proceedings from the fallout of the Danville movement came early in 1973 from Judge
Glynn R. Phillips. Judge Aiken had died two years prior, and the current Danville
Corporation Court judge had recused himself from the case. Judge Phillips suspended any
jail sentences that remained, but did order numerous fines to be paid to the city, which in
total was over $5,000. This action by Judge Phillips was met with intense objection by
the city’s prosecutors, but their cries fell on deaf ears.201
The finale to the civil rights court battles in Danville signaled the end of a messy
and tense decade. The ongoing fight in the courtroom lasted exponentially longer than it
did in the streets and provides significant insights into how white power in Danville
adapted itself in order to uphold its continued resistance to black civil rights in the city.
Judge Aiken was alive and serving as Danville’s Corporation Court judge, yet in the eight
years between the end of the movement and his death he never rescinded his injunction.
Doing so would have brought the fight to an end that resulted in all demonstrators, even
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the ones named in the injunction lawsuit, went free with no fines or penalties. There is no
doubt that the ongoing trials meant the city incurred exorbitant costs in legal fees, and
nullifying the injunction may have meant considerable time and money saved for the city
of Danville. Ten years and 270 people indicates a significant amount of time, money, and
overall resources being poured into these court trials all so that white power in Danville
could be afforded the last word on the matter. When Judge Phillips decided to do away
with the demonstrators’ convictions, white prosecutors objected.202 No matter how long it
took, if all 270 demonstrators could be convicted then that meant they would be
criminals, not fighters for justice or equal rights, but law-breakers. The civil rights
movement in Danville had revealed the force with which white leadership was willing to
fight back against black equality, but the drawn-out court battles revealed the
determination and stamina white power was ready to invest in the fight to ensure they
held onto their power in the end.
It was clear the defeat of the civil rights movement in Danville was the result of
an interlocking web of the city’s institutions of white power which worked together to
reinforce each other’s’ actions and effectively extinguish the Danville movement. The
Register dominated the local narrative received by the white public and made sure no
material that favored the demonstrations in any capacity was ever published. Spreading
misinformation about the movement and its goals, the Register mischaracterized the
movement to its white readers, effectively curtailing white public support. City leadership
had never demonstrated a real desire to work with protestors or listen to their demands,
but instead wrote them off as troublesome, irresponsible criminals. The courts, led by
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Judge Aiken, ensured that no true justice would ever be shown to any civil rights seeker
who found themselves in front of the pistol-toting judge. Through intimidation and
manipulation of the law, Judge Aiken ordered the enforcement of an Antebellum slave
law that allowed the police to react violently and dangerously towards the city’s black
citizens. Knowing their actions would be justified by Judge Aiken and the broader white
public, Chief McCain had borrowed horrendous crowd dispersal techniques used by
Birmingham, Alabama’s own Bull Connor and perpetuated violence and mass arrests of
law-abiding protestors in Danville. Mayor Stinson, Judge Aiken, and Chief McCain
waged war for social and political power in the city, and unlike the demonstrators, they
had the resources and institutional backing to accomplish their goals.
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